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System languages such as C or C++ are widely used for their high per-
formance, however the allowance of arbitrary pointer arithmetic and type-
cast introduces a risk of memory corruptions. These memory errors cause
unexpected termination of programs, or even worse, attackers can exploit
them to alter the behavior of programs or leak crucial data.
Despite advances in memory safety solutions, high and unpredictable
overhead remains a major challenge. Accepting that it is extremely diffi-
cult to achieve complete memory safety with the performance level suitable
for production deployment, researchers attempt to strike a balance between
performance, detection coverage, interoperability, precision, and detection
timing. Some properties are much more desirable, e.g. the interoperability
with pre-compiled libraries. Comparatively less critical properties are sac-
rificed for performance, for example, tolerating longer detection delay or
narrowing down detection coverage by performing approximate or prob-
abilistic checking or detecting only certain errors. Modern solutions com-
pete for performance.
The performance matrix of memory safety solutions have two major as-
sessment criteria – run-time and memory overheads. Researchers trade-off
and balance performance metrics depending on its purpose or placement.
Many of them tolerate the increase in memory use for better speed, since
memory safety enforcement is more desirable for troubleshooting or test-
ing during development, where a memory resource is not the main issue.
Run-time overhead, considered more critical, is impacted by cache misses,
dynamic instructions, DRAM row activations, branch predictions and other
factors.
This research proposes, implements, and evaluates MIU: Memory In-
tegrity Utilities containing three solutions – MemPatrol, FRAMER and
spaceMiu. MIU suggests new techniques for practical deployment of mem-
ory safety by exploiting free resources with the following focuses: (1)
achieving memory safety with overhead < 1% by using concurrency and
4
trading off prompt detection and coverage; but yet providing eventual de-
tection by a monitor isolation design of an in-register monitor process and
the use of AES instructions (2) complete memory safety with near-zero
false negatives focusing on eliminating overhead, that hardware support
cannot resolve, by using a new tagged-pointer representation utilising the
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C/C++ languages have low-level features such as providing a set of bit ma-
nipulators, allowing assumptions about the underlying hardware architec-
ture to take advantages of hardware-specific behaviors/features, and com-
piler support for inline assembly language. Especially C/C++ has pointers
which allow (and often require) direct manipulation of memory contents.
The visibility of memory layout in C or C++ has been two sides of the
coin – it provides high performance however the allowance of arbitrary
pointer arithmetic and type casting imposes the danger of memory cor-
ruption, which makes C/C++ languages unsafe. Those memory errors may
cause unexpected termination of programs. Even worse, security exploits
use memory safety vulnerabilities to corrupt or leak sensitive data, and
hijack a vulnerable program’s control flow.
Despite advances in software defenses, exploitation of systems code writ-
ten in C or C++ is still possible [82, 122, 129, 23]. In response, several de-
fence techniques have been proposed to make software exploitation hard.
Current defenses fall in two basic categories: those that let memory cor-
ruption happen, but harden the program to prevent exploitation, and those
that try to detect and block memory corruption in the first place. In the
first category, for instance, Control-flow Integrity (CFI) [1, 75, 149, 150, 151]
models all allowable control flows in a statically-computed Control-flow
Graph (CFG), while Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [102]
hides the available CFG when the process executes. Both approaches can
be bypassed [41, 120], since memory corruption can still occur, albeit ex-
ploitation is much harder.
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20 Introduction
The second category, providing fine-grained and strong memory safety
enforcement, includes approaches that detect and block memory safety
violations. The approaches instrument the program and maintain run-
time metadata for access rights to block unintended accesses at run-
time [6, 35, 53, 88, 36, 93, 114, 25]. Most of these systems are based on
an inline reference monitor [112, 37] offering deterministic guarantees by pre-
venting memory corruption in the first place. By embedding checks into
the binary code during compilation or via binary rewriting, inline refer-
ence monitors can enforce integrity guarantees for the program’s mem-
ory accesses or control-flow. Violations are detected promptly, with the
instruction at fault identified, which greatly facilitates debugging. These
memory safety solutions, based on inline monitors, are indispensable for
finding memory errors in C/C++ programs during development and test-
ing [94, 114].
Unfortunately for production deployment as an always-on solution, those
approaches checking individual memory access are still heavy [122]. Their
tracking of all objects (or pointers) incurs heavy performance overheads.
Performance is critical for adoption since unsafe languages like C/C++ are
employed for performance-sensitive applications.
Whilst pushing the limit of performance with novel techniques, re-
searchers have made trade-offs among properties of memory safety en-
forcement: detection coverage [4, 146, 5], detection timing [141], compati-
bility [11, 93, 57] and performance. Some early techniques trade off com-
patibility for high locality of reference. One example is so-called fat point-
ers [11, 93, 57], a new pointer representation that stores extra metadata
with the address of an object that the pointer points to. Fat pointers pro-
vide the best speed, but unfortunately impose binary incompatibility issues
with external modules especially pre-compiled libraries. It is desirable to
minimise the disruption owing to tacit assumptions by programmers and
compatibility with existing code or libraries that cannot be recompiled.
To avoid breaking binary compatibility by changing object memory lay-
out, more recent approaches inevitably chose to bear some performance
degradation. Some of them decouple metadata from a pointer represen-
tation and store them in a disjoint metadata. The cost of such fine-grained
memory safety storing per-object [33, 6, 114] (or per-pointer) [88, 143, 53,
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87] metadata in a remote region is dominated by metadata updates and
lookups, making efficient metadata management the key for minimizing
performance impact. These solutions focus on reducing run-time over-
heads by (1) sacrificing detection coverage of memory errors [4, 146, 5] or
precision [6, 9, 8]; or (2) wasting memory space with excessive alignment
or large shadow memory spaces [6, 47, 89, 114] referring to a memory region
as a mirror copy of an application space. Some other solutions trade accu-
racy for speed by allowing false negatives, and hence are more useful for
troubleshooting than security. They still provide wide detection coverage
but have evolved to keep the performance degradation as little as possible
to reduce the time for software testing during development.
In most cases, it is reasonable to prioritise speed over efficiency in space
amongst these two main performance assessment criteria, considering that
memory safety solutions are normally used during development and it is
more critical to reduce time scale than memory resources. However this
perspective invites debates for production deployment. There are systems
whose memory efficiency is as important as time, such as embedded sys-
tems with limited memory space or I/O server systems. In addition, some
causes of run-time overheads can be easily resolved with hardware accel-
eration e.g customised instruction sets, while memory overhead cannot go
away even with the hardware support.
Unfortunately inline reference monitors providing fine-grained memory
protection have not fully resolved overheads caused by tracking individ-
ual memory allocations and accesses to them despite the advances in the
techniques and trade-offs. For light-weight memory safety enforcement,
researchers proposed replacing inline security enforcement with concurrent
monitors [148, 125, 111, 109, 81]. In principle, such approaches can mini-
mize the performance overhead on the protected application by offloading
checks to the concurrent monitor. Detection, however, now happens asyn-
chronously, introducing a detection delay. This weaker security guarantee
is nevertheless still useful. For example, in the case of passive network
monitoring systems, it helps validate the integrity of the system’s past re-
ports.
These proposals, however, face significant challenges. For some, the de-
lay introduced before the detection of memory safety violations opens up
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a vulnerability window during which the attackers have control of the pro-
gram’s execution and may attempt to disable the detection system. This
undermines the guarantee of eventual detection, even worse, security that
those protections aim to achieve by sacrificing spontaneous detection of
memory errors. For others, attempts to isolate the monitor during the vul-
nerability window degrade performance. Finally, these solutions have been
designed for general purpose systems, and their communication and syn-
chronization overheads between the monitor and the application threads
can be prohibitive for high-performance applications.
1.1 Contributions
This research demonstrates trade-offs between detection coverage, detec-
tion timing and performance; pushes the limit of performance metrics to
extreme depending on the deployment; and improves memory safety. We
propose and implement Memory Integrity Utilities (MIU), run-time verifi-
cation systems for low-cost memory safety enforcement, that exploit free
resources. Each approach sacrifices a subset of properties for others de-
pending on the goal, and lowers overhead that is expensive or difficult to
resolve with hardware support.
MIU proposes both:
(1) an inline monitor prioritising near-complete memory safety with sim-
ilar increase in run-time overhead to existing approaches but much
lower space overhead.
(2) a sideline monitor providing the minimal performance degradation by
sacrificing timely and immediate detection.
Firstly, our inline monitor statically instruments an application and halts
program execution at security violations. The goal of the monitor is to pro-
vide fine-grained and deterministic memory protection without relying on
probability, so that it can also be used during development stage. For its
deployment in practice, overhead must be kept low. Compared to exist-
ing approaches, our solution provides higher efficiency in data cache and
memory footprint by utilising the top unused bits in 64-bit pointers. In our
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experiments, Address Sanitizer [114] is faster, however both cause 2x slow-
down, and the run-time overhead for our approach will be resolved with
hardware acceleration (customised instruction sets). While keeping over-
heads for memory and data cache low, we remove false negatives that may
incur in some previous approaches thus guarantee near-complete memory
safety. Another advantage of this approach is its scalability: it can be used
for memory safety, type safety, thread safety and garbage collection, or any
solution that needs to map pointers to metadata.
This inline reference monitor is evaluated on two use cases with run-time
verification systems for C programs detecting:
(i) FRAMER: array-out-of bounds and some cases of dangling pointers
(ii) spaceMiu: type confusions in C programs.
The first system, FRAMER [90, 91], illustrates the use of the capability
framework on spatial memory safety that guarantees near-zero false nega-
tives, allowing inexpensive validation of pointer dereferences by associat-
ing pointers to object metadata containing bounds information. The second
system, spaceMiu, presents the application of the tagged pointer capabil-
ity model to type safety detecting unsafe type casts, that also violate spatial
memory safety. This work defines a type relation for the C language, that
does not support type hierarchy, and unsafe type conversion in C programs,
inspired by CCured [93]; and implements run-time type confusion verifier
utilising efficient per-object type information.
Another contribution of this dissertation is a sideline monitoring system,
MemPatrol [92], for practical deployment for high-performance systems.
This system realises very low performance degradation by pushing other
memory safety properties (immediate detection and error coverage) to ex-
treme. MemPatrol does not detect errors in timely order, yet detects them
eventually. The trade-off drops the overhead down to < 1%, which is lower
than 5%, that is commonly acceptable for production deployment. MemPa-
trol implements a concurrent monitor detecting memory errors, and using
concurrency minimises the performance impact to a target program while
allowing configurable overheads, that can be useful for any systems. This
work addresses one of the challenges of concurrent monitors – a monitor
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being compromised by attackers through memory corruptions during the
detection delay caused by concurrency – by monitor isolation techniques
that leverage CPU registers. It takes advantage of the AES instruction set
of Intel processors [45] to implement CPU-only cryptographic message au-
thentication codes (MACs), and stores critical information in regular regis-
ters of user-mode programs.
This dissertation proposes, designs and evaluates these three run-time
verification approaches that improve memory safety.
2
Background
There are two major categories in security enforcement depending on their
goal. The first category is to detect and defend memory corruption in the
first place by enforcing memory safety, offering stronger security guaran-
tees. The second category aims at a favourable security-to-overhead ratio
rather than complete memory safety. Those approaches in the second cat-
egory let memory corruption occur in the first place but they harden a
program execution, making it difficult to exploit memory corruptions for
attackers, however exploitations are still possible with well-structured at-
tacks.
Probabilistic solutions are usually based on randomization or encryption
e.g. Instruction Set Randomization, Address Space Randomization, or Data Space
Randomization. Randomization protections introduce entropy to prevent ex-
ploits of safety violations. For instance, Data Space Randomization makes
it difficult for attackers to know how to replace values in code pointers by
randomizing representation of all data. Address Space Layout Randomiza-
tion (ASLR) [102, 40] hides the available Control-Flow Graph (CFG) when
the process executes. It mitigates control-flow hijacking attacks by random-
izing the location of code and data and thus the potential payload address.
Both approaches can be bypassed [41, 120] e.g. initial information leak-
age of a code pointer and guessing attacks expose a program in memory
and enable attackers to construct exploits to bypass ASLR however they
can block the majority of attacks. The overhead of ASLR is negligible so
it has been used in practice but the case to enforce full ASLR on Linux
shows 10-25% overhead, which prevents deployment. The overhead comes
from Position Independent Executables (relocatable executables) on 32-bit
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machines and so ASLR should be enforced only for libraries by default
on most distributions. Many protections with probability are in the sec-
ond category that prevents attackers from exploiting memory corruptions
rather than detecting vulnerabilities.
However some of protections built on a probabilistic model belong to
the first category of preventing memory corruptions. Stack smashing pro-
tection, such as StackGuard [26], uses random values for stack cookies (or
canaries) to detect memory overwrites to return addresses (§ 2.3). Although
the detection coverage is not as wide as other memory protection solutions,
e.g. it cannot detect data reads beyond boundaries, these solutions using
encrypted cookies are widely deployed due to their very low overhead and
great compatibility.
The other approaches enforce a deterministic safety policy by implement-
ing a low-level reference monitor [37, 112]. A reference monitor observes the
program execution and halts it whenever it is about to violate the given
security policy, helping remove security vulnerabilities. While traditional
reference monitors enforce higher-level policies, such as file system per-
missions, and are implemented in the kernel (e.g., system calls), more re-
cent reference monitors enforce lower-level policies, e.g., memory safety
or control-flow integrity. They can be implemented in two ways: (1) in
hardware or (2) by embedding the reference monitor into the code through
instrumentation. For instance, Code Integrity + Non-executable Data is en-
forced by the hardware, as modern processors support both non-writable
and non-executable page permissions [79, 80]. Hardware support for pro-
tection with coarse granularity causes negligible overhead, however hard-
ware acceleration may not resolve overhead of low-level monitors with fine
granularity. We discuss hardware implementation especially architectural
support for low-level monitoring in § 2.1.3.
The alternative to hardware support is adding the reference monitor dy-
namically or statically to the code. In this section, we focus only on solu-
tions which transform existing programs to enforce various policies.
Firstly, dynamic (binary) instrumentation [94, 77, 16, 103] can be used to
dynamically insert run-time checks into unsafe binaries at run-time. It sup-
ports arbitrary transformations but introduces some additional slowdown
due to the dynamic translation process. Simple reference monitors, how-
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ever, can be implemented with low overhead: for instance, a shadow stack
costs less than 6.5% performance for SPEC CPU2006 in [103]. More so-
phisticated reference monitors like Taint Checking [14] or ROP detectors [28]
causes overheads that exceed 100% and are unlikely to be deployed in prac-
tice.
Static instrumentation inlines reference monitors at compile time. This
can be done by the compiler or by static binary rewriting. Inline reference
monitors can implement any safety policy and are usually more efficient
than software dynamic solutions, since the instrumentation is not carried
out at run-time. Those approaches provide deterministic and immediate
detection of memory errors with fine granularity, however their high over-
head is one of the biggest challenges to deploy them in practice. Other
performance-optimised solutions for inline monitoring also incur high and
unpredictable overheads [52].
The most widely used security protections implementing an inline ref-
erence monitor are static Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) and memory safety.
CFI restricts the control-flow of an application to valid execution traces by
monitoring the program at runtime and comparing its state to a set of pre-
computed valid states. CFI is a defense that leverages run-time monitors to
detect specific attack vectors (control-flow hijacks for CFI) and flags exploit
attempts at run time. All modern compilers implement a form of CFI with
low overhead but different security guarantees. If security properties are
violated i.e. an invalid state is detected, an alert is raised; reference mon-
itors usually terminate the application. Control-flow hijacking is usually
the primary goal of attacks and many CFI techniques defend them at the
cost acceptable to practical deployment (<5%). We discuss more about CFI
in § 2.3.
On the other hand, memory safety monitors pointer dereferences. It
usually tracks memory allocation (or pointers) and compares a pointer
to be dereferenced with stored metadata such as bounds information or
memory allocation status (alive or de-allocated). Unfortunately inline refer-
ence monitors enforcing memory safety suffer from high overheads (100%),
since they check every memory allocation/release and access. So they often
target development settings when testing a program. Memory corruption
















Figure 2.1: Embedded Metadata: P, UB, and LB represent a pointer
itself, upper bound, and lower bound, respectively.
safety provides a wider range of protection. However the overhead has not
been fully resolved yet and performance is one of the main challenges of
memory protection mechanisms.
In the following subsections, we discuss different software security vul-
nerabilities and identify the approaches to detecting the vulnerabilities and
mitigating exploits.
2.1 Memory Safety
Enforcing memory safety stops all memory corruption exploits. Our focus
is to enforce memory safety based on low-level, inline reference monitors
embedding checks that prevent memory errors by transforming existing
unsafe code. The instrumentation may be in the source code, intermediate
representation, or binary level. For complete memory safety, both spatial
and temporal errors must be prevented without false negatives. In addition,
high-rate false alarms are critical for practical deployment, so they must
be kept very low. Unfortunately it is extremely expensive to guarantee
complete memory safety especially for system languages such as C/C++.
§ 2.1 reviews prior approaches for memory safety based on inline refer-
ence monitor that either track objects or pointers by instrumentation and
discusses their trade-offs between detection coverage and performance.
Another kind of software vulnerabilities, type confusions, will be discussed
in § 2.2 separately.
2.1 Memory Safety 29
2.1.1 Spatial Memory Safety
Spatial memory errors refer to buffer overflows. Buffer overwrites (out-of-
bounds writes) can corrupt the content of adjacent objects, or internal data
(like bookkeeping information for the heap) or return addresses. Similarly,
buffer overreads may can reveal sensitive data or help attackers bypass
address space layout randomization.
The only way to enforce complete spatial memory safety is to keep track of
pointer bounds – the lowest and highest valid address it can point to. Many
approaches have been proposed to enforce spatial memory safety in C/C++
programs. Some of these solutions offer extensive memory protection, but
they slow down applications significantly.
Spatial memory safety solutions are divided into two categories depend-
ing on whether they associate bounds information with individual pointers
or objects.
Pointer-based Tracking
Approaches tracking pointers associate each individual pointer with its
metadata holding a valid address range that the pointer is allowed to
point to [87]. Metadata is assigned to a pointer at pointer assignment and
bounds checking is performed only at memory access unlike object-based
approaches that may require optional extra-checks at pointer arithmetic op-
erations (as discussed later in § 2.1.1). Holding an address range (the base
address ∼ upper bound) provides protection with byte-granularity and this
permits creation of out-of-bounds pointers 1 and pointers to sub-objects that
are allowed in C/C++. This makes it easier to detect internal overflows such
as an array out-of-bounds inside a structure. As long as tracked pointers act
inside instrumented codes, pointer-based approaches do not produce false
violations. However, if instrumented pointers passed to un-instrumented
external libraries are updated there and returned, they lose track of the
pointers (this occurs when the non-instrumented code modifies the pointer
and does not properly update the bounds metadata).
1Out-of-bounds pointers refer to pointers with a value that goes out of bounds of an
object that they point to.
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Pointer-based approaches are often implemented using fat pointers [11,
57, 93, 25]. They define a new pointer representation that embeds meta-
data (the base and upper bound) with itself as presented in Fig. 2.1a), thus
increasing spatial locality of references by removing accesses to retrieve
metadata in a remote memory region at run-time checking. Unfortunately
the approaches sacrifice binary compatibility. Since fat pointers increase
the number of bytes used to hold a pointer, they require modification of
the memory layout and this damages compatibility with non-instrumented
code.
CCured [93], which implements fat pointers, statically annotates a pointer
qualifier (safe, seq, and wild) on pointers discovered by constraint rules
and applies instrumentation depending on the pointer kind. Pointers in-
volved with pointer arithmetic (seq) or typecast (wild) are equipped with
two extra words holding the base and upper bound and especially wild
pointers cause more overheads. All break binary compatibility. This re-
quires wrapper annotations for calls to external libraries and imposes a
conservative garbage collector. Cyclone [57] avoids using garbage collector
in favour of region-based memory management, but also diverges more
markedly from C. Moreover, updates to fat pointers spanning multiple
words are not atomic, while some parallel programs rely on this.
Several pointer-based approaches [143, 89, 53, 87] choose memory lay-
out compatibility over the speed with high locality. Using disjoint metadata
achieves compatibility by decoupling metadata from a pointer represen-
tation and storing metadata in a remote memory region. SoftBound [89]
implements both a hash table or shadow memory space to map pointers
to the metadata. Unfortunately, the performance overhead of SoftBound is
comparably high, 79% on average [89].
Hardware support [30, 53, 100, 135, 63] does not remove this over-
head. Intel MPX [53, 87, 99] is an ISA extension that provides hardware-
accelerated pointer-checking, using disjoint metadata in a bounds table hold-
ing per-pointer metadata as illustrated in Fig. 2.3b. Reportedly, MPX suf-
fers due to lack of memory even with small working sets [66], and has
turned out to be slow for pointer-intensive programs, owing to exhausting
the limited number of special-purpose bounds registers (four registers), re-
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quiring spill operations from regions of memory that themselves require
management and consume D-cache bandwidth and capacity.
Pointer-tracking approaches provide strong memory protection with
near-zero false positives/negatives, but it comes with the additional run-
time overhead from metadata copy and update at pointer assignment,
while object-based approaches update metadata only at memory alloca-
tion/release. In addition, the number of pointers is typically larger than
that of allocated objects, so pointer-intensive programs may suffer from
heavier runtime overheads. More importantly, it is difficult to achieve full
compatibility with them – if a pointer created by the instrumented module
is passed to and modified in an un-instrumented module, the correspond-
ing metadata is not updated, causing false violations.
Object-based Tracking
Due to the compatibility and cost of per-pointer metadata, most techniques
track objects. Object-based approaches [6, 114, 33, 58, 9, 66, 35, 65, 147] store
metadata per object and also make a trade-off against complete memory
safety. They offer compatibility with current source and pre-compiled legacy
libraries by not changing the memory layout of objects. In addition, per-
object metadata is updated only at memory allocation/release so even if a
pointer is updated in an un-instrumented module, the metadata does not
go out-of-sync.
Per-object metadata management supports binary compatibility however
it has some drawbacks. First of all, the approach does not enforce complete
memory safety. For instance, it is more difficult to detect internal overflows
compared to using per-pointer metadata management that can simply set
up a pointer’s metadata with the address range of a sub-object.
One of the disadvantages of object-tracking is that it may not detect
memory access violation when pointers exceed the bounds of right ob-
ject (intended referent) [58] by pointer arithmetic and then land in the
valid range of another object. Memory access with these pointer can be
seen valid in many object bounds-based approaches. Knowing only the
bounds of objects is not enough to catch errors at pointer dereferences, be-
cause we do not know if the pointer points to the intended referent. To
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keep track of them, object-tracking approaches may have to check bounds
at pointer arithmetic [58]. However, performing bounds checks only at
pointer arithmetic may therefore cause false positives, where a pointer going
out-of-bounds by pointer arithmetic is not dereferenced as follows:
1 int *p;
2 int *a = malloc(100 * sizeof(int));
3 for (p = a; p < &a[100]; p++) *p = 0;
Figure 2.2: O-by-one byte
On exiting the for loop, p goes out-of-bounds yet is not dereferenced –
this is valid according to the C standard.
Therefore, object-based approaches should take a special care for out-
of-bounds pointers. The early approach J&K [58] addressed violation of
intended referents by padding objects with extra one byte (off-by-one byte).
This still caused false positives when a pointer legitimately goes beyond
more than one byte. A more generic solution to this problem was later
provided by CRED [110]. Baggy Bounds Checking [6] instead performs
bounds checking at pointer arithmetic, not pointer dereferences, and marks
the out-of-bounds pointers so that errors are reported when those are deref-
erenced.
Object-tracking approaches store a valid range of allocation, so it requires
address range lookups, while pointer-tracking allows access the correspond-
ing entry using the address of a pointer as a key in the metadata table.
Performing lookup on the address range of objects is more expensive than
lookup by key, or different representations. J&K [58] used a splay tree to
reduce the overhead of the range lookup but unfortunately the slowdown
is still high (11x-12x). The approach [33] applied automatic pool allocation
that partitions the memory space using static points-to analysis and stores
metadata for each partition. This technique improved the performance up
to 120% by reducing the number of bounds lookups.
Modern approaches avoid range lookups and reduce slowdown using a
shadow space [6, 114, 147, 24, 47, 94, 5]. Shadow space allows single direct ar-
ray access to metadata and this reduces the increase in executed instructions
for metadata access, removing metadata lookup in a data structure. Necula













Figure 2.3: Disjoint metadata structures of Address Sanitizer and
MPX
and Xu [93] creates a mirror copy of a data structure, i.e. byte-to-byte map-
ping, and SoftBound [89] used both a hashtable and shadow space, and
showed that using shadow space reduces runtime overhead, on average,
by 2/3 compared with using table lookup.
Beyond byte-to-byte mapping of the application space used by early tech-
niques, recent techniques reduced the size of shadow space with compact
encoding, at the cost of minimum allocation size or loss of some preci-
sion. An example is Baggy bounds checking (BBC) [6]. BBC divides the
memory space into fixed-sized blocks and mandates object alignment to the
base of a block, to prevent metadata conflicts caused by multiple objects in
one block. Consequently it pads each object to the next power of two, so
that each one-byte sized entry stores only log2(padded object size). This
allows compact bounds information and fast lookup by sacrificing mem-
ory efficiency. BBC addresses violation of intended referents by checking
bounds at pointer arithmetic, not at memory access, and marking point-
ers going out of padded bounds so that they are detected at dereference.
This can cause false positives when an illegal pointer comes back within
their valid range without being dereferenced. BBC performs approximate
bounds checking which tolerates pointers going out-of-bounds yet within
the padded bound. Memory access with those pointers violates spatial
memory safety however it still enforces security, preventing exploits.
Address Sanitizer [114] (ASan) utilizes shadow space differently. Like
BBC, it also re-aligns and pads each object but it pads an object with red-
zones front and back as shown in Fig. 2.3a. While BBC stores log2 (padded
object size) in a corresponding entry in the shadow space and tolerates
access to the pad, ASan considers access to redzones as out-of-bounds,
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providing greater precision. The errors are identified by the value in the
corresponding entry in the shadow. At memory access, ASan derives the
address of its corresponding entry from a pointer, and the entry tells if the
address is addressable. ASan also prevents some dangling pointers by forcing
freed objects to stay in a so-called quarantine zone for a while. A disadvan-
tage of ASan is that its error detection relies on spatial or temporal distance.
It loses track of pointers going far beyond the redzone and reaching an-
other object’s valid range and it makes it tricky to address false negatives
caused by violation of intended referents. ASan addresses this issue by en-
larging the space between objects. The wider the redzone, the more errors
ASan detects. In addition, use-after-free errors cannot be detected, in the
cases where dangling pointers are used to access objects after the pointer
is freed from the quarantine. ASan detects most errors, but it is less deter-
ministic in theory and trades-off memory space for detection coverage. In
our experiments comparing ASan and our prototype, ASan and FRAMER’s
normalised memory footprints are 8.84 and 1.23, respectively.
Rather than fat pointers or shadow space, tagged pointers [65, 66] can in-
stead be used since there are unused bits in a pointer e.g. top 16 bits in a
64-bit pointer. SGXBounds [66] trades-off address space for speed and near-
complete memory safety. SGXBounds makes objects carry their metadata
in a footer as shown in Fig. 2.1b, and utilizes the higher 32 bits of a pointer
to hold the metadata location. The location is the upper bound of its ref-
erent at the same time and object size information is stored in the footer.
Storing the absolute address of bounds frees SGXBounds from violation of
intended referents that challenge many object-tracking approaches. How-
ever this approach works when there are enough spare bits in pointers,
which is the case with SGX enclaves, where only 36 bits of virtual address
space are currently supported.
Hardware-accelerated tagged pointers are available without sacrificing
address space. ARM v8.5 ISA [9, 8] introduces the Memory Tagging Exten-
sion (MTE). This assigns a 4-bit tag to each 16 bytes at memory allocation,
and tapping memory accesses with incorrect tags in the pointer. However,
this approach has 1/16 chance of false negatives at each memory access
when the tags in the memory and a pointer match. In case of a real-world
exploitation, the random 1/16th chance on an individual access rapidly
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disappears to an acceptable level over the course of tens of operations but
still provides a usable channel that can be exploited over multiple similar
systems in a structured attack. However this solution still relies on proba-
bility for memory safety.
In the above subsections, we have discussed approaches to prevent spa-
tial memory errors especially on buffer overflows. Similarly, uninitialised
pointers containing garbage values may happen to point at a valid object,
so we make sure that pointers are initialised. Lastly, it is difficult to track
sub-objects such as an array in a structure or in an outer array, so it may
require to manage additional information such as type information.
2.1.2 Temporal Memory Safety
Temporal memory safety violations (dangling pointers) include null pointer
deferences, use-after-free, or double-free errors. Dangling pointers arise when
pointers are dereferenced (used) after the memory area they try to derefer-
ence has been deallocated and returned to the memory management sys-
tem. Attacks exploiting vulnerable pointers after referent objects are re-
leased are as strong as spatial memory safety violation, letting the pointers
deference attacker-controlled data.
Dangling pointers often occur in attempts to access freed heap objects
and tend to be exploited in conjunction with type confusion errors. Assume
a dangling pointer pointing to a new object tries to read memory with the
freed object’s type. When a virtual function of the freed object is called
and the virtual function pointer is looked up, the content of the new object
will be interpreted as the vtable pointer of the old object. This allows the
corruption of the fake vtable pointer, comparable to exploiting a spatial
write error, but in this case the dangling pointer is only dereferenced for a
read. An additional aspect of this attack is that the new object may contain
sensitive information that can be leaked when read through the dangling
pointer of the old objects type.
Temporal memory errors also occurs in stack-allocated objects. Pointers
to a local variable, that are assigned to a global or heap pointers, become
dangling when the function of the local variable returns while the pointer
is still alive. In this case, dangling pointers are exploited to overwrite sen-
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sitive data. Writing through a dangling pointer is similarly exploitable as
an out-of-bounds pointer by corrupting other pointers or data inside the
new object. When the dangling pointer is an escaped pointer to a local
variable and points to the stack, it may be exploited to overwrite sensitive
data, such as a return address.
Like spatial memory safety solutions, approaches to ensure temporal
memory safety [4, 88, 86, 118, 2, 32] can be divided into two categories:
(1) to block temporal memory errors in the first place and (2) to prevent
exploitations of dangling pointers.
Like spatial memory safety enforcements (§ 2.1.1), the approaches in the
first category also track live objects or pointers to detect dangling pointers.
Valgrind’s Memcheck [94] and Address Sanitizer (Asan) [114] track objects
and mark their status in corresponding entries in the shadow memory.
These tools can detect dangling pointers attempting to access after their
referent object is de-allocated, as long as new objects are not yet allocated
in the locations. However they produce false negatives when the memory
region is re-allocated; the area is registered again and the invalid access
remains undetected. ASan removes some false negatives by keeping freed
objects in the quarantine area to prevent use-after-free errors during limited
period of time but still may miss some errors. Object-tracking approaches
provides less complete temporal memory safety compared to pointer-based
approaches like spatial memory safety. Unfortunately, their overheads are
quite high. Valgrind, based on dynamic instrumentation, causes higher
overhead (10x), while ASan built on LLVM causes around 2x.
Pointer-tracking approaches provide stronger protection. A pointer is
associated with allocation/release status information along with bounds
information for complete memory safety. A pointer needs to uniquify live
objects i.e. to distinguish not only two objects in different memory regions
but also two temporally-distinctive objects allocated in the same memory
area. CETS [88] assigns a unique ID to each live object and a pointer to
the object is associated with the ID. The IDs are stored in a global dic-
tionary. Together with SoftBound [89], a pointer-based spatial memory
safety solution, CETS guarantees near complete memory safety. The aver-
age overhead is 48% solely and with SoftBound+CETS is 2x. As mentioned
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in § 2.1.1, these tools have false violations when pointers are updated in
external un-instrumented modules.
Approaches in both categories are still heavy for practical deployment
and even for debugging for some benchmarks. Some approaches nar-
row detection coverage down for low run-time and memory overheads.
Cling [4] suggests a customised dynamic memory allocator replacing mal-
loc routines. It enforces type-safe memory re-use among only objects with
same type and alignment. It does not target detection of all dangling point-
ers; instead it aims at preventing use-after-free attack exploiting combined
vulnerabilities: dangling pointers and type confusion errors. Since it is em-
bodied in the memory allocator, it detects only temporal memory errors of
heap objects.
2.1.3 Architectural Support and Capability Model
Memory protection systems such as Mondrian Memory Protection [139],
Hardbound [30], Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions
(CHERI) [135], M-Machine [21], and industrial approaches such as Intel’s
Memory Protection Extensions (iMPX) [53] and Arm’s Memory Tagging
Extension (MTE) [8, 9] have been proposed for architectural support for
fine-grained memory safety.
Mondrian [139] is a memory protection model layered atop page-based
virtual memory, to facilitate multiple protection domains. The page table
is supplemented by a Protection Look-aside Buffer (PLB) for managing
permissions and a set of sidecar registers are paired with general-purpose
registers to reduce PLB pressure. This removes requiring userspace ISA
changes to support Mondrian, enhancing incremental deployment.
Mondrian provides address validity that associates protection properties
with regions of address space (mentioned in § 2.1.1) rather than a per-
pointer basis. It pads all allocations to introduce guard regions like MMU
guard pages. Smaller pads are possible than with pages, while reducing
the threshold at which most overflows can be detected. This however pre-
vents the approach from providing protection for sub-allocations such as
array entries or individual stack frames, and this may undermine finer-
grained protection. This is particularly a concern today when many classes
38 Background
of exploitable security vulnerabilities are premised on overflows with at-
tacker control over inputs to arithmetic. In addition, Mondrian relies on
supervisor mode to manage its protection table. This demands a domain
switch for each allocation and free event so protection-domain scalability
is limited – each domain requires its own complete protection table, each
with substantial memory and initialization expense.
Hardbound [30] is a hardware-assisted fat-pointer. The approach pro-
vides pointer-based memory safety, not address validation or object-based
safety, thus provides finer-grained protection than Mondrian. Hardbound
utilises a shadow space to store the base and bounds for each pointer-aligned
virtual memory location, and another metadata space of tag bits to identify
pointers in order to reduce the overhead of non-pointers. Bounds informa-
tion is initialized by the modified software – a memory allocator for heap
objects and ideally also by a compiler for stack and global objects. The
metadata are then propagated and validated by the hardware i.e. a simu-
lated in-order processor propagates bounds into the shadow table via regis-
ters and verifies bounds, when pointers are dereferenced. Un-instrumented
libraries and applications will experience less mitigation.
Hardbound provides compatibility: its executables can run on legacy
hardware and ABIs are maintained by retaining native pointer size. How-
ever its fat pointers are forgeable: an instruction adding or modifying the
bounds information allows arbitrary bounds, and the tables are accessible
via virtual memory. As a result, Hardbound pointers do not constitute
a protection domain. Hardbound is also a CISC design that proposes a
microcode implementation, and requires transactional memory to write to
three table entries atomically.
Intels Memory Protection Extensions (iMPX) [53] provides Instruction
Set Architecture (ISA) for spatial memory safety. They describe additions
to the x86 ISA to provide hardware-acceleration for compiler-based mem-
ory protection with disjoint metadata. As with Hardbound, bounds informa-
tion per pointer is stored in architecturally-supported shadow tables or also
in software-defined locations (adjacent to the pointer itself) and bounds
checking is performed using explicit instructions.
MPX does not support pointer compression. Each 64-bit pointer con-
sumes four metadata: base, upper bounds, the expected pointer value,
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and 64 reserved bits. The expected pointer is used for comparison with a
pointer value after a pointer returns back from external modules. If there
is a mismatch, MPX drops tracking the pointer. MPX sacrifices memory ef-
ficiency for compatibility with legacy code which may not update bounds,
unlike Hardbound. MPX does not address use-after-free errors but sup-
ports typecast checking, making it one of the strongest spatial memory
safety enforcements.
Armv8.5-A [8, 9] introduced a new feature called Memory Tagging.
ARMv8.5-MemTag (MTE) provides architectural support for memory pro-
tection using lock and key access to memory. Tagging memory implements
the lock and pointers (virtual addresses) are modified to contain the key.
Memory access is permitted only if the key matches the lock. Memory loca-
tions are tagged by adding four bits of metadata to each 16 bytes of physical
memory (Tag Granule). MTE supports random tag generation and pseudo-
random tag generation based on a seed. Due to the limited number of tag
bits available (4 bits), the same tag may be allocated for different memory
allocations for any specific execution, which causes false negatives. In the
aspect of exploitations, the random 1/16th chance on an individual access
rapidly disappears to an acceptable level over the course of tens of opera-
tions but still provides a usable channel that can be exploited over multiple
similar systems in a structured attack. In order to implement the key bits
without requiring larger pointers, MTE uses the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) fea-
ture of the Armv8-A Architecture. With TBI enabled, the top byte of a
virtual address is ignored when using it as an input for address transla-
tion. This allows the top byte to store metadata and four bits of the top
byte are used to provide the key.
The memory bandwidth impact will depend greatly on the underlying
hardware architecture and could be close to zero if the tags are largely im-
plemented in separate hardware resources and blocks are normally cleared
on allocation. In addition, the code overheads for heap operations is small
but users may prefer to avoid the run-time management overheads by dis-
abling MTE for stack operations.
Capability-based security is a different concept of security models. First
of all, a capability (known as a key) is a communicable and unforgeable
token of authority and capability-based security refers to the principle of
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designing user programs such that they directly share capabilities with
each other according to the principle of least privilege, and to the operating
system infrastructure necessary to make the transactions secure.
A capability defines a protected object reference which grants a user pro-
cess access rights to interact with an object e.g. reading data associated with
an object, modifying the object, and executing the data in the object as a
process. The capability logically consists of a reference that uniquely iden-
tifies a particular object and a set of access rights and a user program must
use the capability to access an object. This capability model can be imple-
mented in a number of different ways: operating systems [29, 62, 137, 115],
languages [3, 84], and hardware [140].
M-Machine [21], one of the early systems, is a 64-bit tagged-memory ca-
pability system implementing guarded pointers tracking pointers (§ 2.1.1).
M-Machine pointers are unforgeable. They define a protection domain
within a single address space, and support protection-domain switching.
It compresses a fat pointer to 64 bits: only power-of-two aligned and sized
segments are supported therefore padding is required for common struc-
tures that break binary layouts.
Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI) [140] is a
hybrid capability model that extends the 64-bit MIPS ISA with byte-
granularity memory protection. The key features are a capability coproces-
sor and tagged memory. The coprocessor supports 32 compiler-managed
capability registers, each 256-bit wide, holding capabilities. For memory
safety, CHERI implements hardware fat pointers in the form of capabili-
ties. Each memory capability holds the base and length fields, describing a
segment of memory, and the permissions field indicating an allowed per-
mission for the region such as load data, store data, execute, and load and
store for capabilities. It avoids race conditions, which challenged fat point-
ers, by updating capability fields and tags atomically.
Capability models must preserve capability integrity, while allowing user-
space management, i.e. capabilities in memory must not be corrupted by
general-purpose stores. CHERI implements tagged memory to protect in-
memory capabilities. Valid capabilities are identified by an extra tag bit
associated with each 256-bit location. Any non-capability store clears this
bit, protecting capabilities in memory without appealing to kernel mode.
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Regional separation [137, 62] is another way to protect capabilities: defin-
ing memory regions that can store capabilities distinct from those that can
store data. This has limitations, since most programming languages allow
pointers and user data neighboring.
Incremental adoption of memory protection systems is critical but com-
patibility has challenged the deployment of capability systems. CHERI
improves earlier capability systems with limited adoption, by hybridiz-
ing capability-based addressing with a RISC ISA and MMU-based virtual
memory. It provides both fine-grained protection as well as compatibility.
2.2 Type Safety
A program is called type-safe when it never explicitly or implicitly converts
values from one type to another. One way to ensure type safety of a pro-
gram is to use type-safe languages. However due to the comparably poor
performance of those languages, unsafe system languages such as C or
C++ are still widely used for high-performance systems.
Type conversion in C/C++ is sometimes required and useful despite its
risk to undermine the integrity/safety of a program. For example, im-
plicit type conversion from an array to a pointer to the 1st element of
it (array decay), the result of a floating pointer operations stored in an
int-typed variable, or unsigned int value passed to a function taking
a signed int. These unsafe type conversions may cause data loss or re-
interpretation of a value, therefore we make sure that every memory object
including a variable, function argument, and function return value hold
an acceptable kind of data; and operations involving values of different
types, informally speaking, make sense and do not cause data loss, incor-
rect interpretation of bit patterns, or memory corruption. Type confusions
are often combined with dangling pointers for attacks – the memory area
of the deallocated object (the old object) is reused by another object (new
object). The type mismatch between the old and new object can allow the
attacker to access unintended memory.
Several approaches [36, 46, 56, 60, 69] have been proposed to prevent vi-
olations of spatial memory safety through unsafe typecasting. Those can be
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categorised into two depending on if they are based on per-object (pointer)
metadata or vtable pointers.
One kind of approach [15, 31, 124, 149] is based on vtable pointers em-
bedded in objects in C++. These approaches save run-time overhead by
avoiding manipulation of per-object (or pointer) metadata, that signifi-
cantly slows down many run-time verification systems. However they usu-
ally do not support type checking between non-polymorphic classes, not
having a vtable, without breaking binary compatibility. Control-Flow In-
tegrity (CFI) [128, 54, 130, 39] prevents some of these exploits by verifying
all indirect control flow transfers within a program to detect control-flow
hijacking. However, these techniques address the type confusion problem
only partially if control flow is hijacked, i.e., they detect usage of the cor-
rupted vtable pointer, ignoring any preceding data corruption.
The other approaches [46, 93, 56, 60] are based on tracking live objects
or pointers. The solutions track individual objects or pointers and store/u-
tilise per-object (per-pointer) type information. Most of them, except fat
pointers, secure interoperability with un-instrumented modules and sup-
port non-polymorphic classes. However, they incur high run-time over-
head to manage metadata. Like deterministic bounds checking, the ap-
proaches suggested their own metadata management mechanism to reduce
performance loss. This research focuses on the second category of type
confusion verification based on per-object (or pointer) metadata.
Type safety enforcements based on per-object/pointer type metadata fo-
cus type conversions taking advantage of features of type hierarchy, since
the majority of typecasts in C/C++ programs are either upcasts (conversion
from a descendant type to its ancestor type) or downcasts (in the opposite
direction). Upcasts are considered safe, and this can be verified at compile
time, since if a source type of upcasts is a descendant type, then the type
of the allocated object at runtime is also a descendant type.
In contrast, the target type of a downcast may mismatch the run-time
type. If a target type is a descendant type of the target type, an access to
the object after downcasts may cause type confusion, a security vulnerability
including internal overflows. Recognition of the run-time type is undecid-
able, so downcasts require run-time checking to prevent type confusion.
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One of the challenges of run-time typecast verification is pointer-to type
mapping. Typecast pointers to different types may have moved to one of
the sub-fields of its referent object and run-time checkers should map the
pointer to the corresponding type at the offset. This requires an efficient
management of both (1) per-object type information and (2) per-type mem-
ory layout. We need to associate an individual object (or pointer) with its
object type and map a pointer to the object’s type using type information
in the metadata storage, which unfortunately causes high overheads. A
pointer then should be mapped to a type at the corresponding offset, and
examined if the type conversion from the type at the offset to a target type
is safe.
Another challenge is to determine what type conversion is safe e.g. to de-
fine what upcasts and downcasts are in C language. First of all, since C lan-
guage does not support type hierarchy, unlike C++, we should define the
hierarchy in C and their relation with other types. For example, arbitrary
pointers are frequently converted to void* and passed inter-functionally
as an argument, which is allowed and considered safe. In CCured [93],
void is considered to be an empty structure and a prefix of any type, that
is, any type is a sub-type of void. Under this definition of sub-typing, it is
allowed to upcast from a pointer in any type into void*. The pointer is
then typecast from void* to other types (desirably restoring its type) for
access, requiring type confusion checking at runtime. It is more tricky to
judge valid casts between non-void types. Strict rules on type conversion
can cause false positives, while loosening them can bring false negatives.
CCured [93] ensures both memory and type safety enforcements (§ 2.1.1).
This approach observed that most typecasts in real programs are safe up-
casts (from a pointer to object to a pointer to the first sub-object), and the
rest is mostly downcasts (in the opposite direction) in C programs written in
the object-oriented style. CCured adopted physical sub-typing [22] defining
type hierarchy in C by flattening aggregate types to primitives (atomics) to
reduce wild pointers (§ 5.2).
CCured is based on fat pointers [11, 57, 93]. Approaches tracking an indi-
vidual pointer [89, 53, 87] provide strong and precise memory/type safety
allowing to associate a pointer with any corresponding type i.e. a higher
composite type or sub-type. However it suffers heavier run-time overhead
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to manipulate per-pointer metadata. In addition, embedding metadata in-
side objects opens a vulnerability of polluting metadata through memory
writes following bad typecasts. CCured addresses this by updating/check-
ing tags at memory access, causing further overhead. Although amongst
pointer-tracking approaches, using fat pointers guarantees the high perfor-
mance, the compatibility issue has not been resolved yet. More modern
memory/type safety enforcements store per-object information in disjoint
metadata storage to secure the compatibility.
TypeSan [46] is designed for an always-on solution for explicit type
checks in C++. This approach, inspired by CaVer [69], focuses on conver-
sion from an instance of a parent class to a descendant class. Downcasting
is frequently used if the parent class lacks some of the fields or virtual
functions of the descendant class. When the program subsequently uses
the fields or functions of the descendant class that do not exist for a given
object, it may use data as a regular field in one context and as a virtual
function table (vtable) pointer in another.
TypeSan uses the per-allocation (per-object) paradigm [18, 33, 6, 47, 114]
and is composed of two services: type management and metadata storage.
Firstly, type management service is responsible for associating type layout
with each allocation site and validating downcast operations with these
layouts. This service includes (1) a type layout table holding mappings of
unique offsets to data fields corresponding to nested types and (2) a type
relation table holding compatible types for each class. The second service is
metadata storage mapping from object base addresses to type layout tables.
Like many other modern run-time verification tracking objects or pointers,
the approach creates shadow space [6, 47, 68, 89, 114] for pointer-to-type
mapping. TypeSan is based on variable compression ratio memory shad-
owing [47]. It allows more detailed memory allocation than other shadow
space but it also mandates a uniform alignment. Approaches using shadow
space spend more memory space to reduce the run-time overheads with
the small increase in dynamic instructions. The trade-off can be merely
an issue for debugging/testing during development, but still makes it less
useful as an always-on solution on memory-intensive systems such as on
embedded systems or IO-servers.
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Other approaches [60, 105] exploit debugging infrastructure and in-
strument the programs allocators. Their analysis is invoked from a
debugger, rather than running continuously during execution. Unlike
other approaches checking at typecasts followed by pointer dereferences,
Libcrunch [60] checks pointer creations not uses, reducing the number of
run-time checks, since pointer creations are much less frequent than deref-
erences. This imposes false negatives since a pointer can be typecast before
use. In addition, it unwraps structure type only one level, unlike CCured or
one of our prototypes (spaceMiu) unrolling down to primitive types as in
physical sub-typing. Libcrunch’s check is relatively strict, because there are
hardly real code which requires the full permissiveness of physical typing.
Some other approaches [19, 76] attach physical types to machine words,
unfortunately causes high overheads (10x ∼ 100x) [145].
One of the challenges of type safety enforcement is to define type hi-
erarchy for C programs and safe/unsafe typecast unlike array out-of-
bounds checking which has more straightforward definitions of valid/in-
valid memory access. Judgements of typecasts in C programs may differ
depending on C programmers’ coding style and intention.
2.3 Control-Flow Protection
Attackers often exploit memory corruptions to take control over the pro-
gram by diverting its control-flow. If this attack fails by Code Integrity en-
forcement, attackers attempt to use memory corruptions to corrupt a code
pointer. Code Pointer Integrity aims at preventing the corruption of code
pointers.
Code Pointer Integrity [67] in the first category of security enforcement,
which detects and defends memory corruption in the first place, offers
stronger security guarantees. The approach moves all code pointers to a
safe place and prevents the process from corrupting the safe place. Mem-
ory corruption can still happen but all controlling data are protected. How-
ever, so far, these techniques can be either bypassed or incur a significant
overhead to the running process. The probabilistic defense protecting the
safe region can be used [42, 38]. For example, using Authenticating Page
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Mapper (APM) [42], which builds on a user-level page-fault handler to
authenticate arbitrary memory reads/writes in the virtual address space,
hardens information hiding with negligible overhead on average <1%.
While Code Pointer Integrity aims to prevent the corruption of code
pointers, Control-flow Integrity detects it. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) [1,
126, 75, 97, 106, 149, 150] preventing illegal control flow is one example
in the second category. CFI mechanisms normally consist of two compo-
nents: (1) a static analysis component to construct the Control-Flow Graph
(CFG) of the application and (2) a dynamic enforcement to restrict control
flows according to the generated CFG. In a nutshell, CFI restricts the set
of possible target locations (indirect jump target including subroutine re-
turn) by executing a run-time monitor that validates the target according
to the constructed set of allowed targets. If the observed target is not in
that set, the program terminates. Most CFI approaches apply two different
mechanism depending on indirect control-flow transfers: forward-edge and
backward-edge. Forward-edge control-flow transfers direct code forward to
a new location and are used in indirect jump and indirect call instruc-
tions. The backward-edge is used to return to a location that was used in
a forward-edge earlier, e.g., when returning from a function call through a
return instruction.
For forward-edge transfers, the code is usually instrumented with equiv-
alence checks to ensure that the target observed at runtime is in the set of
valid targets. This run-time check depends on the precision of CFI, for
instance, a full set check or a simple type comparison.
Checking backward-edge transfers should be handled differently, since
equivalence checking does not work when the control-flow is redirected to
any valid call sites by attackers upon return from a callee. Strong backward-
edge protections therefore leverage the context through the previously
called functions on the stack. A mechanism that enforces stack integrity
ensures that any backward-edge transfers can only return to the most re-
cent prior caller. This property can be enforced by storing the prior call
sites in a shadow stack or guaranteeing memory safety on the stack [5],
i.e., if the return instructions cannot be modified then stack integrity triv-
ially holds. CFI approximates the CFG for better performance and this
allows attackers to leverage the approximation for delivering exploits [41].
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On the other hand, in the presence of information leaks, randomization can
be bypassed, since hidden code can be revealed [120].
Original CFI mechanism [1] reported overhead with 16% on average for
an old version of the SPEC benchmarks, while the maximum measured is
as high as 45%. The implementation which uses a shadow stack mecha-
nisms for returns has an additional 10% overhead. Write Integrity Testing
(WIT) [5] recorded less overhead (25%), while enforcing both weak mem-
ory safety and the same security policy for control-flow hijacking. The
experiments presented in [17] showed that more recent, compiler-based
CFI mechanisms (e.g. VTV [126], VTI [15], or LLVM-CFI 3.9 [75]) have low
overheads (<5%) suitable for widespread adoption in production environ-
ments. VTV and VTI are limited to virtual method call, while LLVM-CFI
3.9 supports all indirect calls.
Dynamic return integrity is another approach to enforce control flow. In-
stead of preventing all indirect control transfers, it prevents only illegal
returns, since stack-based buffer overflow exploits are the most common
form of exploit for remotely taking over code execution. Stack smash-
ing [7] is the most well-known control-flow hijacking attack, which exploits
a buffer overflow in a local variable to overwrite the return address on the
stack. StackGuard [26], the first proposed solution, addressed the attack by
placing a secret value (called as cookies/canaries) between the return ad-
dress and the local variables. Any changes to the cookies are regarded as
overwrites to the return address by a buffer overflow and this is detected by
the check placed before the return instruction. Stack cookies do not protect
indirect calls and jumps, and they are also vulnerable to direct overwrite
attacks and information leaks. The mechanism is still popular and widely
deployed, since its cost is extremely low – the performance overhead is
negligible (less than 1%) and no compatibility issues are introduced.
Shadow stack [131, 127] improves canary-based mechanism, extending it
to solve information leaks and direct overwrites. Stack Shield [131] creates
a shadow stack and stores the saved return address in the shadow. Upon
function return, the shadow copy can be compared with the original re-
turn address. The shadow stack is not protected but checking if two return
addresses match makes attackes much harder, because attackers must suc-
cessfully corrupt both return addresses in a remote memory region in a
48 Background
limited time (i.e. before the function returns). To protect the shadow stack
itself, RAD [127] uses guard pages or switching write permission to protect
the shadow stack area. While Stack Shield does not protect against direct
overwrites with low cost, RAD with stronger protection causes 10x slow-
down.
2.4 Concurrent Monitoring
Memory safety enforcement based on inline monitoring provides extensive
detection coverage of memory errors. However, heavy and unpredictable
run-time overheads of inline monitoring applied at so fine-a-grain makes
it unattractive for production deployment in performance-critical applica-
tions, such as passive network monitoring systems. Even performance-
optimized solutions for inline monitoring incur high and unpredictable
overheads [52].
The unpredictability of the performance overhead incurred from inline
monitoring is a problem by itself. Its runtime overhead is highly dependent
on the code being instrumented. A few instructions inserted in a tight loop
can translate to a large number of dynamic instructions at runtime, causing
a significant performance impact. Moreover, additional memory accesses
for security checks may increase memory bandwidth and cache misses.
Inlined checks cannot abstain from using the cache hierarchy and slow
down the application.
To avoid the costs of inline reference monitors, researchers proposed re-
placing inline security enforcement with concurrent monitors. [148, 125,
141, 111, 109, 81]. In principle, such approaches can minimise the perfor-
mance overhead on the protected application by offloading checks to the
concurrent monitor. Detection, however, now happens asynchronously, in-
troducing a detection delay. This weaker security guarantee is nevertheless
still useful. For example, in the case of passive network monitoring sys-
tems, it helps validate the integrity of the system’s past reports.
With the advent of multicore machines, utilizing spare CPU cores for
security became an attractive approach. Multi-Variant Execution Environ-
ments (MVEE) [111] uses spare core capacity to run several slightly dif-
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ferent versions of the same program in lockstep, monitoring them for dis-
crepancies. This approach, however, is impractical for high-performance
multicore programs utilizing the majority of the CPU’s cores, and there
can still be a shared cache impact of concurrent monitoring.
Cruiser [148] is one of the original systems to decouple security checks
from program execution, running them instead in a thread inside the ad-
dress space of the monitored process. Cruiser’s guarantees are probabilis-
tic. Its low detection latency, for the programs it was evaluated on, helps
defend against tampering with its data structures, but is not a reliable so-
lution on its own. Moreover, for performance-critical applications using
large amounts of heap memory, like network traffic identification systems,
the detection latency would increase significantly due to the sheer num-
ber of canaries, and should not be relied upon for security. Cruiser also
employs pseudo-isolation using ASLR and surrounding its data structures
with inaccessible guard pages, in the hope that blind access will trigger
segmentation faults. Recent studies [98], however, demonstrate that faith
in ASLR-based information hiding is misplaced. Therefore, these systems
do not offer a strong guarantee against tampering with the monitor’s exe-
cution before a compromise is detected. Without reliable isolation, the risk
of exploitation remains as long as there is detection delay.
Other software-based techniques utilizing spare CPU cores include Shad-
owReplica [55] and TaintPipe [81], which aim to improve the performance
of dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) for security. DIFT is a com-
prehensive protection mechanism, and these solutions demonstrated sig-
nificant performance improvements over inline DIFT, but the remaining
overhead due to the presence of inline stub code remains significant (> 2×
slowdown over native execution).
Some memory protections with limited detection coverage can be
adopted for concurrent monitoring system due to their effectiveness and
simplicity, unlike inline monitors with strong protection but high overhead
from tracking objects/pointers (§ 2.1.1). Combining them can resolve run-
time overheads of inline monitors to the level of practical deployment.
StackGuard [26] detected exploitations of stack-based buffer overflows
by placing a canary word before the return address, and checking it when
the stack frame is deactivated. Similar solutions are currently widely de-
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ployed due to their light weight, and the idea has been extended to heap
buffer overflow detection [95, 108] with canary checks triggered by memory
management routines, library routines, or system calls.
2.4.1 Monitor Isolation
Eventual detection of errors in monitoring systems may not be guaranteed
when they are compromised. Concurrent monitors are also vulnerable to
the risk, unless the monitoring systems bear the heavy overheads to protect
the monitor itself. The problem of the isolation of monitoring systems has
been addressed by using OS kernel or VM hypervisor mechanisms [12, 95,
125]. These are comparatively safer, but come with additional overhead and
engineering costs. Instead, MemPatrol presents a userspace-based solution,
sharing the address space of the main application. Our solution minimises
the overhead on the execution of the main application threads while at the
same time it allows monitoring the entire memory of the application if so
required. Finally, it avoids any engineering costs for the maintenance of
custom kernel modifications.
Other software-based isolation mechanisms using Software Fault Isola-
tion (SFI) [133] suffer from overheads because they inline checks to the code
that needs to be contained. NativeClient [144] has an average overhead of
5% for CPU-bound benchmarks, which is acceptable for deployment in
practice.
2.4.2 Kernel Integrity Monitors
Kernel integrity monitors (KIMs) periodically inspect critical kernel mem-
ory regions, such as syscall tables and persistent function pointers, isolat-
ing themselves from the kernel by residing in hypervisors [50] or hardware
such as PCI cards [104]. Some KIMs tackle transient attacks by snooping
the bus traffic using PCI cards [83] or even commodity GPGPUs [64].
2.4.3 Cryptographic Key Protection
TRESOR [85], a disk encryption system that defends against main memory
attacks, uses a similar CPU-only cryptographic mechanism based on AES-
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NI [45], but stores its secret key in special CPU debug registers in each core
and is kernel-based.
Note that the availability of the AES-NI instruction set is not a hard re-
quirement, but rather an optimization and implementation convenience.
For example, Loop-Amnesia [117], a disk encryption system similar to
TRESOR, does not rely on AES-NI. We could avoid the dependency on
the special AES instruction set by using their CPU-only implementation of
AES.
MACs have been previously used in Cryptographic Control Flow In-
tegrity (CCFI) [78] to protect control flow elements such as return ad-
dresses, function pointers, and vtable pointers. CCFI also takes advantage





FRAMER [90, 91], presented in Chapter 4, is an inline reference monitor
that implements a capability framework with object granularity. Its sound
and deterministic per-object metadata management mechanism enables di-
rect access to metadata by calculating their location from a tagged pointer
by exploiting unused top 16 bits of a 64-bit pointer.
FRAMER can be the base of a solution for both (1) practical deployment
with customised ISA for its efficiency of memory footprint and cache mem-
ory and (2) sound runtime verification during development.
This may improve the performance of memory safety, type safety, thread
safety and garbage collection, or any solution that needs to map pointers to
metadata. FRAMER improves over previous solutions by simultaneously
1. providing a novel encoding that derives the location of per-object
metadata with low memory overhead and without any assumption
of objects’ alignment or size,
2. offering flexibility in metadata placement and size,
3. saving space by removing any padding or re-alignment, and
4. avoiding internal object memory layout changes.




The spaceMiu design, presented in Chapter 5, a run-time type confu-
sion checker for C programs based on tagged pointers-capability model.
spaceMiu defines type hierarchy in C programs; validates type conversion
using per-object type metadata; and authorises only safe memory access at
run time that removes software vulnerabilities in the first place.
Type conversion in C with weak type rules is frequently used and some-
times required, however arbitrary typecasts impose the risk of memory
corruption of programs, causing vulnerability exploitations to leak sensi-
tive data and hijack a program’s logic. Static analysis can validate type
conversion in many cases however some violation should be examined at
run-time. Run-time type confusion checkers track live objects (or point-
ers) and check typecasts using per-object/pointer type metadata. Unfor-
tunately it causes high overheads, making efficient metadata management
the key for performance.
Many large-sized C programs are written in an object-oriented style and
the majority of typecasts in C (also in C++) programs [93, 116]. If an al-
located objects type is a descendant type of the target type at downcast,
access to an object after downcasts may cause memory corruptions includ-
ing internal overflows, commonly known as type confusion.
Inspired by CCured’s view on sub-typing, our type confusion checker,
spaceMiu, defines up/downcast and provides relaxed validity of typecasts.
It applies typecast rules conservatively with our efficient per-object type
metadata management utilising tagged pointers. This work shows how we
ensure type safety with tagged pointers-capability model that enables di-
rect access to type metadata. This framework can be used to support mul-
tiple potential security enforcements including memory safety in parallel.
3.3 MemPatrol
MemPatrol [92], presented in Chapter 6, a “sideline” integrity monitor that
allows us to minimise the amount of performance degradation at the ex-
pense of increased detection delay. Inspired by existing proposals, Mem-
Patrol uses a dedicated monitor thread running in parallel with the other
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threads of the protected application. Previous proposals, however, either
rely on costly isolation mechanisms, or introduce a vulnerability window
between the attack and its detection. During this vulnerability window,
malicious code can cover up memory corruption, breaking the security
guarantee of “eventual detection” that comes with strong isolation. The
key contributions of this work are (i) a novel userspace-based isolation
mechanism to address the vulnerability window, and (ii) to successfully
reduce the overhead incurred by the application’s threads to a level accept-
able for a performance-critical application. We evaluate MemPatrol on a
high-performance passive network monitoring system, demonstrating its
low overheads, as well as the operator’s control of the trade-off between




Capability System with Memory
Safety Applications
4.1 Overview
Security mechanisms for systems programming languages, such as fine-
grained memory protection for C/C++ based on inline reference monitor-
ing, authorize operations at runtime using access rights associated with ob-
jects and pointers. The cost of such fine-grained capability-based security
models is dominated by metadata updates and lookups, making efficient
metadata management the key for minimizing performance impact. Ex-
isting approaches reduce metadata management overheads by sacrificing
precision, breaking binary compatibility by changing object memory lay-
out, or wasting space with excessive alignment or large shadow memory
spaces.
With these limitations in mind, object-capability models [29, 68, 134, 140],
using hardware-supported tags, become very attractive, because they can
manage compatibility and control run-time costs. However, they cannot
entirely avoid undesirable overheads such as metadata management re-
lated memory accesses just by virtue of being hardware-based. In turn,




FRAMER: A Tagged-Pointer Capability System with Memory Safety
Applications
This chapter presents FRAMER [90, 91], a memory-efficient capability
model using tagged pointers for fast and flexible metadata access. FRAMER
provides efficient per-object metadata management that enables direct ac-
cess to metadata by calculating their location using the (currently) unused
top 16 bits of a 64-bit pointer to the object and a compact supplementary
table. The key considerations behind FRAMER are as follows.
Firstly, our tagged pointer encoding can enable the memory manager
freedom to place metadata in the associated header near the object to max-
imise spatial locality, which has positive effects at all levels of the memory
hierarchy. Headers can vary in size, unlike approaches that store the header
at a system-wide fixed offset from the object, which may be useful in some
applications. Headers can also be shared over object instances. We do not
develop that aspect in the current implementation and we leave for future
work to manipulate a memory manager for full freedom to place a header
or shared header.
Secondly, the address of the header holding metadata is derived from
tagged pointers regardless of objects’ alignment or size. FRAMER uses a
novel technique to encode the relative location of the header in unused bits
at the top of a pointer. Moreover, the encoding is such that, despite being
relative to the address in the pointer, the tag does not require updating
when the address in the pointer changes. A supplementary table is used
only for cases where the location information cannot be directly addressed
with the additional 16-bits in the pointer. The address of the corresponding
entry in the table is also calculated from a tagged pointer. With the help
of the tag, this table is significantly smaller compared to typical shadow
memory implementations.
Thirdly, we avoid wasting memory from any padding and superfluous
alignment, whereas existing approaches using shadow space [6, 47, 68, 89,
114] re-align or group objects to avoid conflicts in entries, FRAMER pro-
vides great flexibility in alignment, that completely removes constraining
the objects or memory. The average space overhead of our approach is 20%
for full checking despite the generous size of metadata and the supplemen-
tary table in our current design.
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Fourthly, this approach facilitates compatibility. FRAMER’s tag is en-
coded in otherwise unused bits at the top of a pointer, but the pointer
size is unchanged and contiguity can be ensured.
In this study, to achieve deterministic memory protection with data mem-
ory efficiency, while preserving the full 48-bit address space available
in contemporary CPUs, FRAMER sacrifices dynamic instruction count.
FRAMER (1) reins in the increase in extra cache misses for metadata (owing
to spatial locality compared with a total shadow memory approach) and
(2) tolerates an increase in executed instructions for arithmetic operations.
This may sound unfavourable since the increase in dynamic instructions
is one of the major contributors to performance loss. However, note that
we can move to an even sweeter spot in the future where the instruction
overhead for calculation is reduced via customised ISA. In addition, the
measured performance ends up being better than might be expected – the
evaluation shows excellent D-cache performance where the performance
impact of software checking is, to a fair extent, mitigated by improved
instructions per cycle (IPC). FRAMER’s framework provides a novel en-
coding that derives metadata pointer from an object pointer by exploiting
the unused top 16 bits of a 64-bit pointer, lowering both memory footprint
and cache misses. FRAMER’s metadata management does not make any
assumption of object alignment or size. This avoids wasting memory for
padding or re-alignment. At the same time, it minimises additional cache
misses that are consumed to access metadata in a remote region. In the
experiments, normalised L1 D-cache miss counts for FRAMER and ASan
on average are 1.40 and 2.31, respectively.
The contributions of FRAMER are the following:
• FRAMER presents an efficient encoding technique for relative offsets
that is compact and avoids imposing object alignment or size con-
straints. Moreover, it is favourable for hardware implementation.
• Based on the proposed encoding, this chapter designs, implements
and evaluates FRAMER, a generic framework for fast and practical
object-metadata management with potential applications in memory
safety, type safety and garbage collection.
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This work demonstrates promising low memory overheads and high
instruction-level parallelism.
4.2 FRAMER Approach
In a nutshell, FRAMER places per-object metadata close to their object and
calculates the location of metadata from only (1) an inbound pointer 1 and
(2) additional information tagged in the otherwise unused, top 16 bits of
the pointer. We exploit the fact that relative addresses can be encoded in far
fewer bits than absolute addresses with assistance from the memory man-
ager to restrict the distance between the allocation for an object and a sep-
arate object for its metadata. In the current implementation, the metadata
is stored in front of the object, essentially as a header that an object carries
with itself, requiring only a single memory manager allocation. Our own
memory manager can be implemented for the future design. For the re-
maining cases where the relative address cannot fit in a 16-bit tag, we use a
compact supplementary table to locate the header. The tag encodes when
this is the case, and also sufficient information to locate the supplementary
entry.
We are now going to introduce the concept of frames used to encode
relative offsets. We first define frames in § 4.2.1 and show how to calculate
an object’s wrapper frame in § 4.2.2. In § 4.2.3 we explain how relative
location can be encoded in a tagged pointer using these concepts, and how
to exploit this encoding to reduce the supplementary table’s size.
4.2.1 Frame Definitions
To record the relative location in the top 16 bits of a 64-bit pointer, which
are spare in contemporary CPUs, we define a logical structure over the
whole data space of a process, including statics, stack, and heap. The
FRAMER structures are based on the concept of frames, defined as memory
blocks that are 2n-sized and aligned by their size, where n is a non-negative
1An inbound pointer is a pointer whose value is within the valid range of an object it
points to.
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Memory Space
Aligned Frames
Figure 4.1: Aligned frames in memory space: a memory space can be
divided into frames that are defined by memory blocks
that are 2n-sized and aligned by their size. A memory
object’s wrapper frame is the smallest frame completely
containing the object. For instance, the 2-byte sized ob-
ject a’s wrapper frame size is 21 (called 1-frame). In the
same way, objects b and c’s wrapper frames are 4-frame
and 3-frame, respectively.
integer. A frame of size 2n is called n-frame. A memory object x will in-
trinsically lie inside at least one bounding frame, and x’s wrapper frame is
defined as the smallest frame completely containing x, so there exists only
one wrapper frame for x. For instance, in Fig. 4.1, each sharp-cornered box
represents a byte, and contiguous coloured bytes are objects allocated in
memory (e.g. object a has a size of 2 bytes). Memory space is divided to
frames illustrated as round-cornered boxes. Objects a,b and c’s wrapper
frames are (n = 1)-frame (or 1-frame), 4-frame, and 3-frame, respectively.
For 0 ≤ m < n, we call m-frames placed inside an n-frame f, f’s subframes.
Frames have several interesting properties. Firstly, an n-frame is aligned
by 2m for all m < n. Secondly, an object’s wrapper frame size is not pro-
portional to the object’s size. As shown in Fig. 4.1, the object b has a larger
wrapper frame than c, even though b’s size is smaller. This is because the
wrapper frame size for an object is determined by both the object’s size
and location. Thirdly, as discussed previously, an object’s wrapper frame
is defined as the smallest frame containing the object. Given an object x,
its wrapper frame is obtained by finding a frame having x’s base (i.e. lower
bound) and upper bound in its lower-addressed (n − 1)-subframe and
higher-addressed (n− 1)-subframe, respectively. For example, in Fig. 4.1,
object b’s lower and upper bound are placed in b’s wrapper frame (4-
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frame)’s lower-addressed and higher-addressed 3-subframes, respectively.
It is trivial to prove that an object’s wrapper frame is the frame having the
object’s lower and upper bound in its biggest subframes, as presented in
Appendix 8.1.1.
Following basic malloc semantics, FRAMER does not natively support
object movement or growth (we reset its wrapper frame at realloc).
Therefore, there exists a unique wrapper frame for each object, and it is
determined at memory allocation. Since it does not change during the
life time of an object, we can encode the metadata location using an offset
relative to the wrapper frame. At memory allocation, we determine the
wrapper frame for the allocated object and store the metadata offset in the
pointer tag.
4.2.2 Frame Selection
We now show how to calculate the size of the wrapper frame, given an
object. We call an object whose wrapper frame is an n-frame an n-object.
For any k-object o, since its wrapper frame (i.e. a k-frame) is aligned by
2k by definition, the addresses of all bytes in the frame coincide in their
most significant (64− k) bits, and so do the addresses of all bytes in o. In
addition, the base and upper bounds are located in the lower and higher-
addressed (k − 1)-frame, respectively. This means that the (k − 1)th least
significant bit of the base and that of the upper bound are complementary
to each other.
Based on these, we can calculate k, the binary logarithm (log2) of o’s
wrapper frame’s size. Let (b63, ..., b1, b0) and (e63, ..., e1, e0) bit vectors of
k-object o’s base and upper bound respectively, and X a don’t care value.
We derive log2(wrapper frame size) by performing XOR (exclusive OR)
and CLZL (count leading zeros) operations as follows (b63 is the most
significant):
(b63, ..., bk, b(k−1), b(k−2), ..., b0)
(e63, ..., ek, e(k−1), e(k−2), ..., e0) XOR
(0, ..., 0, 1, X, ..., X) CLZL
(64− k)
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We then get k by subtracting the result of the CLZL operation from 64,
since k = 64− (64− k).
4.2.3 Metadata Storage Management
FRAMER’s memory manager places metadata in a header before the object
contents. For instance, in Fig. 4.3, a, b and c are all objects containing a
header. Using any bounding frame as a frame of reference, we can encode
the location of the object’s metadata (i.e. header) relative to the base of this
frame. We can then derive the metadata location given an inbound pointer
using the following:
1. the binary logarithm of the bounding frame size (N = log22N)
2. an offset to a header from the bounding frame base
Given an inbound pointer and a bounding N-frame, aligned by 2N by
definition, we derive the bounding frame’s base by clearing the pointer’s
N least significant bits. This means that once a bounding frame’s N value is
known to us, we can obtain the frame’s base without any other information
but the address in an inbound pointer’s 48 lower bits.
Having the value of N at hand, we may tag pointers with the offset from
the bounding N-frame’s base to the header. However, even with the value
of N provided, the 16 bits of the tag cannot hold the large offsets required
for some combinations of wrapper frame size and header location. For
instance, a (N = 20)-object’s offset (20-frame’s base ∼ the header) may
need up to 19 bits.
To encode within the limited space of unused 16 bits of a pointer with
both an arbitrary offset and N value, FRAMER divides the virtual address
space into slots with a fixed size of 215 bytes, aligned to their size, i.e., 15-
frames. Slots are set to a size of 215 so that offsets to the header of objects
can be encoded in the unused 15 bits of a pointer (one bit among 16 is
reserved for a flag described subsequently). In Fig. 4.3, da is the offset to
the header of the object a.
FRAMER then distinguishes between two kinds of objects, depending
on their wrapper frame size, namely small-framed and large-framed objects.
Small-framed objects are defined as (N ≤ 15)-objects, i.e. objects whose
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Figure 4.2: Tagged pointer: the tag depends on the value of N (binary
logarithm of the wrapper frame size of a referent object).
wrapper frame size is less than/equal to 215. Large-framed objects are
defined as (N > 15)-objects. For example, in Fig. 4.3, object a is small-
framed, whereas b and c are large-framed. One extra bit, in particular the
most significant, is used for a flag indicating if the object is small-framed or
large-framed as shown in Fig. 4.2. We handle objects differently depending
on their kind.
Small-framed Objects
Small-framed objects are completely contained in a single slot, so any
pointer to them is derived to the slot base by zeroing the 15 least significant
bits of the pointer. The offset of a small-framed object x’s header from the
base of the slot containing x is stored in the 15-bit pointer tag. For instance,
in Fig. 4.3 we tag pointers to the small-framed object a with da (slot0’s
base ∼ a’s header).
We further turn on the most significant bit of the pointer to indicate that
the particular object is small-framed. FRAMER then recognises a pointer
to a small-framed object by the flag being on and takes the 15-bit tag as an
offset to its header from the base of the slot containing the object. This way,
we avoid storing the value of N for small-framed objects.
In summary, when we retrieve metadata from a header of a small-framed
object (i.e., flag is on), inbound (in-slot) pointers are derived to the base of
the slot by zeroing the 15 least significant bits (log2(slot size) = 15), and
then to the address of the header by adding the offset to the base address
of the slot as follows:
1 // FLAG_MASK: ˜(1ULL << 63)
2 // flag is on
4.2 FRAMER Approach 65
3
4 offset = (tagged_ptr & FLAG_MASK) >> 48;
5 slot_base = untagged_ptr & (˜0ULL << 15);
6 header_addr = slot_base + offset;
7 obj_base = header_addr + header_size;
Small-framed objects are overwhelmingly common. Our experiments
showed the number of large-framed objects is very low compared to small-
framed ones: 1: > 200,000 on average and 1: millions in some benchmarks.
This is fortunate, because the header location for small-framed objects is
derived from tagged pointers alone, while large-framed objects require ad-
ditional bits of information. We describe encoding for large-framed objects
next.
Large-framed Objects
Since large-framed objects span several slots, zeroing the 15 least significant
bits (log2 of slot size) of a pointer does not always lead to a unique slot
base, thus the offset in the tag cannot be solely used to derive their relative
location. In Fig. 4.3, a pointer to a 16-object b can derive two different slot
bases (slot0 and slot1) depending on the pointer’s value, and that is
the case for 17-object c (slot1 and slot2). In addition, the offsets from
the base of their wrapper frame ((N > 15)-frame) to an (N > 15)-object’s
header may not fit in spare bits. Hence, for large-framed objects, we need
to store additional location information. We store these additional bits in
a supplementary table, and use a different encoding in the pointer tag
to derive the address of the corresponding entry from any pointer to the
object. We stress here that the location of this entry is also derived using the
tag in a way that enables much smaller tables than typical shadow memory
implementations.
During program initialisation, we create a table holding an entry for
each 16-frame. We call such a frame a division. Each entry contains one
sub-array and the sub-array per division is called a division array. Each
division array contains a fixed number of entries potentially pointing to
metadata headers, in the current implementation as follows:
1 typedef struct ShadowTableEntryT {
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Figure 4.3: Access to division array: the object a is small-framed,
while b and c are large-framed. da is the oset to a. h
denotes a header and |ta| is the size of a. b and c’s entries
are mapped to the same division array. The entries in the
division arrays store their corresponding object’s header
location, while the small-framed object a does not have
an entry. Only one entry of division1’s array is actually
used, since the division is not aligned by 217.
2 HeaderTy *division_array[48]; // 64-16
3 } DivisionT;
Contrary to small-framed objects, in the tag for large-framed objects we
store the binary logarithm of their wrapper frame size (i.e., N = log22N)
as shown in Fig. 4.2. The address of an entry in a division array is then
calculated from an inbound pointer and the N value, and the entry holds
the address of a header. By definition, a wrapper frame of an (N ≥ 16)-
object is aligned by its size, 2N, therefore, the frame is also aligned by 216.
This implies that a (N ≥ 16)-frame shares the base address with a certain
division, and is mapped to that division.
Each (N ≥ 16)-object maps to one division array, but that division ar-
ray contains entries for multiple large-framed objects. In Fig. 4.3, both
division0 and 17-frame0 are mapped to division0. Their mapped
division (division0) is aligned by 217 at minimum, while division1 is
aligned by 216 at max.
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The tag N can be used as an index into the division array to associate
a header pointer, stored in an entry in the division array, with each large-
framed object mapped to the same division. For each N ≥ 16, at most
one N-object is mapped to one division array, and the proof is presented
in Appendix 8.1.2. We use the value N as an index of a division array, and
tag N in the pointer. Given a N value-tagged pointer (flag==0), we derive
the address of an entry as follows:
1 // UBASE: division base of userspace’s base
2 // SCALE: binary logarithm of division_size, i.e. 16
3 // TABLE: address of a supplementary table
4 // flag is off
5 // p is assumed tag-cleaned here
6
7 frame_base = p & (˜0ULL << N);
8 table_index = (frame_base - UBASE) / (1ULL << SCALE);
9 DivisionT *M = TABLE + table_index;
10 header_addr = M->division_array[N - SCALE];
The base of the wrapper frame (i.e. the base of the division) is obtained
by zeroing the least significant N bits of the pointer. The address of its
division array is then derived from the distance from the base of virtual
address space and log2(division size) (216). Finally we access the corre-
sponding entry with the index N in the division array.
Entries in a division array may not always be used, since an entry cor-
responds to one large-framed object, which is not necessarily allocated at
any given time, e.g. if object b is not allocated in the space in Fig. 4.3, 0th
element of division0’s array would be empty. This feature is used for
detecting some dangling pointers, and more details are explained in § 4.4.2.
Unlike existing approaches using shadow space, FRAMER does not re-
align objects to avoid conflicts in entries. Our wrapper frame-to-entry map-
ping allows wrapper frames to be overlapped, that gives full flexibility to
memory manager.
We could use different forms of a header such as a remote header or
a shared header for multiple objects, with considering a cache line, stack
frame, or page. In addition, although we fixed the division size (216), future
designs may offer better flexibility in size.
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Figure 4.4: Overall architecture of FRAMER
We showed how to directly access per-object metadata only with a tagged
pointer. Our approach gives great flexibility to associate metadata with
each object; gives full freedom to arrange objects in memory space, that
removes padding objects unlike existing approaches using shadow space.
This mechanism can be exploited for many purposes: the metadata can
hold any per-object data.
4.3 FRAMER Implementation
This section describes the current implementation of FRAMER which is
largely built using LLVM. Additionally, we discuss how we offer compati-
bility with existing code.
4.3.1 Overview
There are three main parts to our implementation: FRAMER LLVM passes,
and the static library (lib), and the binary library in the dashed-lined box in
Fig. 5.8. The target C source code and the hooks for FRAMER’s functions
in the static library are first compiled to LLVM intermediate representation
(IR). Our main transformation pass instruments memory allocation/re-
lease, access, or optionally pointer arithmetic in the target code in IR. In
general, instrumentation simply inserts a call to library functions, however,
our use of header-attached objects and tagged pointers requires further
transformations at compile-time. The third part is wrappers around mal-
loc family (malloc, calloc, realloc, and free) routines and string
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functions. Those function are interposed at link time in the current im-
plementation but it is also reasonable to implement customised functions
instead of wrapping them to reduce overheads instead of calling subrou-
tines.
Our customised compiler optimisations are discussed in § 4.5.
We also had to modify the LLVM framework slightly. Our main trans-
formation is implemented as a LLVM Link Time Optimisation (LTO) pass
for whole program analysis, and runs as an LTO pass on gold linker [74],
however, incremental compilation is also possible.
We also insert a prologue that is performed on program startup. The
prologue reserves address space for the supplementary metadata table, but
pages are only allocated on demand.
4.3.2 Memory Allocation Transformations
We instrument memory allocation and deallocation to prepend headers
and update metadata by transforming the target IR code at compile time.
Stack-allocated Objects (address-taken locals)
For each local allocation of aggregate-type that needs a header, we create a
new object with a structure type that contains two fields, one for the header
and one for the original allocation as follows:
1 struct __attribute__((packed)) newTy {
2 HeaderTy hd;
3 Ty obj; // Ty is an original object’s type
4 };
We insert a callsite to our hook function that decides if it is small or
large-framed, updates metadata in the header, and also in the entry for
large-framed objects. It then creates a flag and tag (offset or N value), and
moves the pointer to the second field whose type is the actual allocated type
by the target program. The hook returns a tagged pointer. The allocation
of the original object is removed by FRAMER’s pass, after the pass replaces
all the pointers to the original object with the tagged pointer to the new
object.
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We instrument function epilogues to reset entries for large-framed non-
static objects. Currently we instrument all the epilogues, and utilise the
entry values for detecting some cases of dangling pointers, that will be
discussed in § 4.4.2. This instrumentation can be removed for better per-
formance – entries can be simply over-written at the next update to them.
Statically-allocated objects (address-taken globals)
Creating a new global object with a header attached is straightforward,
however, other parts of the implementation are more challenging.
For static/global objects, pointers to them cannot be replaced with a
tagged one (i.e. the return value of the hook), since the return value of
a function is non-constant, whereas the original pointer may be constant
e.g. an initializer of other static/global objects or an operand of constant
expression (LLVM ConstExpr) [71]. The initializer and operands must
be constant, hence, replacing with a tagged pointer should be done stati-
cally for global objects.
While the tag should be generated at compile-time, the wrapper frame
size is determined by their actual addresses in memory, that are known
only at run-time. To implement a tagged pointer generated from run-time
information at compile-time, FRAMER’s transformation pass builds Con-
stExpr of (1) the wrapper frame size N (2) offset, (3) tag and flag selec-
tion depending on its wrapper frame size, (4) pointer arithmetic operation
to move the pointer to the second field, and then finally (5) constructs a
tagged pointer based on them. The original pointers are replaced with
this constant tagged pointer. The concrete value of the tagged pointer is
then propagated at run-time, when the memory addresses for the base and
bound are assigned.
FRAMER inserts at the entry of the program’s main function a call to
an initialisation function for each object. This function updates metadata
in the header and, for large-framed objects, the address in the table entry,
during program initialisation.
4.3 FRAMER Implementation 71
Table 4.1: FRAMER inserts code, highlighted in gray, for creating a
header-padded object, updating metadata and detecting
memory corruption. Codes in line 2, 5, and 8 in the first
column are transformed to codes in the second column.
Original C Instrumented C
1 struct HeaderTy {unsigned size; unsigned type id;};
struct newTy{HeaderTy hd;int A[10];};
2 int A[10]; struct newTy new A;
3 tagged = handle alloc(&new A, A size);
/* tagged = tag | &(new A->A[0]),
A size = sizeof(int) * 10 */
4 int *p; int *p;
5 p = A+idx; p = tagged + idx;
6 check inframe(tagged, p);
7 untagged p = check bounds(p, sizeof(int));
8 *p = val; *untagged p = val;
Heap objects
We interpose calls to malloc, realloc, and calloc at link time with
wrapper functions in our binary libraries. The wrappers increase the user-
defined size by the header size, call the wrapped function, and perform the
required updates and adjustments similar to the hook for stack objects. We
also interpose free with a wrapper to reset table entries for large-framed
objects.
4.3.3 Memory Access
FRAMER’s transformation pass inserts a call to our bounds checking func-
tion right before each store and load, such that each pointer is exam-
ined and its tag stripped-off before being dereferenced. The hook extracts
the tag from a pointer, gets the header location, performs the check using
metadata in the header, and then returns an untagged pointer after clean-
ing the tag. The transformation pass replaces a tagged pointer operand of
store/load with an untagged one to avoid segmentation fault caused by
dereferencing it.
Bounds checking and untagging are also performed on memcpy, mem-
move and memset in similar way. (Note that LLVM overrides the C li-
72
FRAMER: A Tagged-Pointer Capability System with Memory Safety
Applications
brary functions to their intrinsic ones [73]). memmove and memcpy has two
pointer operands, so we instrument each argument separately.
As for string functions, we interpose these at link time. Wrapper func-
tions perform checks on their arguments, call wrapped functions with
pointers cleared from tags, and then restore the tag for their return value.
4.3.4 Interoperability
FRAMER ensures compatibility between instrumented modules and regu-
lar pointer representation in pre-compiled non-instrumented libraries by
stripping-off tagged pointers before passing them to non-instrumented
functions. FRAMER adds a header to objects for tracking, but this does
not introduce incompatibility, since it does not change the internal mem-
ory layout of objects or pointers.
There is another rare case of false positives (we did not encounter them),
where library code uses a tagged pointer to read from memory, where our
instrumentation did not have a chance to clear the tag as follows:
1 struct Node { // Linked list node
2 int data;
3 struct Node* next;
4 };
5
6 // The function length is externally-compiled
7 int length(struct Node * head){
8 int result = 0;
9 struct Node* current = head;
10 while (current != NULL) {
11 result++;




At the call to the function length, FRAMER’s pass loses a chance to
tag-clean pointers to instrumented nodes except the pointer head passed
as an argument. One way to address this is to track memory allocation very
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conservatively – performing points-to and the whole program analysis, and
instrumenting only objects whose pointers stay inside the instrumented
modules. Unfortunately despite the heavy static analysis, many objects
will be dropped from tracking. The certain way is to force ignoring the
top bits at memory access with hardware support or, with a performance
overhead, by a segmentation fault handler.
4.4 FRAMER Applications
In this section we discuss how FRAMER can be used for building security
applications. We explore mainly spatial safety, but we discuss additional
case studies related to temporal safety.
4.4.1 Spatial Memory Safety
FRAMER can be used to track individual memory allocations, and store ob-
ject bounds in the header associated with the object. These bounds can be
used at runtime to check memory accesses. Unlike other object-tracking or
relative location-based approaches, FRAMER can tackle legitimate pointers
outside the object bounds without padding objects, or requiring metadata
retrieval or bounds checking at pointer arithmetic operations.
This subsection describes how FRAMER performs bounds checking at
run-time.
Memory allocation
As described in § 4.3.2, a header is prepended to memory objects (lines 1,
2 in Table 4.1). For spatial safety, this header must hold at least the raw
object size, but can hold additional information such as type information.
This could be used for additional checks for sub-object bounds violations
or type confusion. Its potential in type confusion checking is presented in
§ 5, and we do not experiment with these in this chapter.
Once we get the header address from a tagged pointer, an object’s base
address is obtained by adding the header size to the header address. After a
new object is allocated, a hook (handle alloc) updates metadata, moves
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the pointer to (new A->A), and then tags it (line 3). The pointer to the
removed original object is replaced with a tagged one (A to tagged in line
5).
Pointer arithmetic
As mentioned in § 2.1.1 and Figure 2.2, going out-of-bounds at pointer
arithmetic does not violate memory safety, as long as the pointer is not
dereferenced. However, skipping checks at pointer arithmetic can lose track
of pointers’ intended referents. Baggy Bounds Checking [6] handles this by
marking such pointers during pointer arithmetic and reporting errors only
when dereferenced, and J&K [58] pads an object by off-by-one byte.
Instead of padding, we include one imaginary off-by-one byte (or multiple
bytes) when deciding the wrapper frame (see § 4.2.2) on memory alloca-
tion. The fake padding then is within the wrapper frame, and pointers to
this are still derived to the header, even when they alias another object by
pointer arithmetic. The biggest advantage of fake padding is that it is al-
lowed to be overlapped with neighboring objects and thus saves memory.
The fake padding does not cause conflicting supplementary table N values
across objects possibly overlapping the bytes.
FRAMER tolerates pointers to the padding at pointer arithmetic, and
reports errors on attempts to access them. FRAMER detects those pointers
being dereferenced, since bounds checking at memory access retrieves the
raw size of the object. Currently FRAMER adds fake padding only in the
tail of objects, but it could be also attached at the front to track pointers
going under lower bounds, even though such pointers are banned by the
C standard.
Beyond utilising fake padding, to make a stronger guarantee for near-
zero false negatives, we could perform in-frame checking at pointer arith-
metic (line 6 in Table 4.1). We can derive the header address of an intended
referent, as long as the pointer stays inside its wrapper frame (slot for
small-framed), in any circumstance. In Fig. 4.5, consider a pointer (p),
and its small-framed referent (a). Assuming p going out-of-bounds to
p’ by pointer arithmetic, p’ even violates its intended referent, but p’
is still within slot0. Hence, p’ is derived to a’s header by zeroing lower







Figure 4.5: By pointer arithmetic, a pointer p goes out-of-bounds
(p’), and also violates its intended referent (a to b).
FRAMER still can keep track of its referent, since p’ is
in-frame. p" is out-of-frame, which we catch at pointer
arithmetic.
log2(slot size) (15) bits and adding offset. This applies the same for
large-framed objects.
Hence, we could check only out-of-frame (p" in Fig. 4.5) by performing
simple bit-wise operations (no metadata retrieval) checking if p and p’ are
in its wrapper frame (or slot for small-framed):
1 // p: the source pointer of pointer arithmetic
2 // p’: the result of pointer arithmetic
3 // N: log2 wrapper_frame_size (or slot_size)
4 is_inframe = (p’ˆp)&(˜0ULL<<N);
5 assert(is_inframe==0);
FRAMER may report false positives for programs not comforming to the
C standard with out-of-frame pointers getting back in-frame by pointer
arithmetic without being dereferenced while they are out-of-frame. This is
very rare, and those uses will be usually optimised away by the compiler
above optimisation level -O1. Normally the distance between an object and
its wrapper frame’s bounds is large. We can also increase the wrapper
frame size for all objects to enlarge this distance.
Memory access
As mentioned in § 4.3.3, we instrument memory access by replacing pointer
operands so that the pointers are verified and tag-stripped, before being
dereferenced (line 7,8 in Table 4.1).
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check bounds first reads a tagged pointer’s flag revealing whether the
object is small or large-framed. As we described in § 4.2.3 and 4.2.3, we
derive the header address from either an offset or an entry, and then get
the object’s size from the header and its base address as follows:
1 obj_base = header_addr + sizeof(HeaderTy);
2 obj_size = ((HeaderTy *)header_addr)->size;
We then check both under/overflows ((1) and (2) below, respectively).
Detection of underflows is essential for FRAMER to prevent overwrites to
the header.
assert(untagged_p >= obj_base); // (1)
assert(untagged_p + sizeof(T) - 1 <= upperbound)); // (2)
// Where T is the type to be accessed
The assertion (2) aims to catch overflows and memory corruption caused
by access after unsafe typecast such as the following example:
char *p = malloc(10);
int *q = p + 8;
*q = 10; // Memory corruption
In a similar fashion, we interpose string functions (mem* and str*) with
our wrappers around them. Handling individual function depends on how
each function works. For instance, strcpy copies a string src up to null-
terminated byte, and src’s length may not be equal to the array size hold-
ing it. As long as the destination array is big enough to hold src, it is safe,
even if the source array is bigger than the destination array. Hence, we
check if the destination size is not smaller than strlen(src), returning
the length up to the null byte as follows:
assert(dest_array_size <= strlen(src));
4.4.2 Temporal Memory Safety
FRAMER may need additional metadata and implementation to to provide
temporal memory safety enforcement [4, 32, 88, 118] but can still detect
some forms of temporal memory errors that we now discuss briefly.
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Each large-framed object is mapped to an entry in a division array in
the supplementary table, and the entry is mapped to at most one large-
framed object for each N. We make sure an entry is set to zero whenever
a corresponding object is released. This way, we can detect an attempt to
free an already deallocated object (i.e. a double free), by checking if the
entry is zero. Access to a deallocated object (i.e. use-after-free) is detected
in the same way during metadata retrieval for a large-framed object. Note
that this cannot detect invalid temporal intended referents, i.e., an object is
released, a new object mapped to the same entry is allocated, and then a
pointer attempts to access the first object.
Detection of dangling pointers for small-framed objects is out-of-scope
in the current implementation.
4.5 Optimisations
It is very expensive to check every memory access. Support of static analy-
sis and program transformation can reduce overheads, for example, some
operations might be redundant such as tag-cleaing on tag-free pointers.
We applied both our customised and LLVM built-in optimisations. This
subsection describes customised optimisations for FRAMER. Suggestion of
further optimisations is provided later in § 4.7.3.
Implementation Considerations As described in § 4.3.2, we replaced all
occurrences of an original pointer to a global object with a tagged one
in constant expression (LLVM ConstExpr). Unfortunately, we experienced
runtime hotspots due to the propagation of a constant (a global variable’s
address) to every large ConstExpr. To work around this issue we created
a helper global variable for each global object; assigned the result of the
constant propagation to the corresponding helper variable during program
initialisation; and then replaced uses of an original pointer with load of
the helper variable. This way, runtime overheads are reduced, for instance,
benchmark anagram’s overhead decreased from 14 to 1.7 seconds.
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Non-array Objects We do not track non-array objects that are not in-
volved with pointer arithmetic, e.g., int-typed objects. It is redundant to
perform bounds checking or untagging for pointers to them. We filter out
simple cases, easily recognised, from being checked. In the general case,
it is not trivial to determine if a pointer is untagged at compile time, since
back-tracing the assignment for the pointer requires whole-program static
analysis.
Safe Pointer Arithmetic Instead of full bounds checks, we only strip off
tags for pointers involved in pointer arithmetic and statically proven in-
bound for simple cases. For pointers where the bounds can be determined
statically, we checks if the index is smaller than the number of elements.
In some SPEC benchmarks, there are statically proven out-of-bound ac-
cesses, but we do not report memory errors since they may be unreachable.
We inserted a termination instruction for this case so that it can report er-
rors at runtime, when the execution reaches the point.
Hoist Run-time Checks Outside Loops Loop-invariant expressions can be
hoisted out of loops, thus improving run-time performance by executing
the expression only once rather than at each iteration. We modified SAFE-
Code’s [34, 119] loop optimisation passes, and added the modified pass to
the LLVM LTO pass pipeline, so that it can be run after FRAMER’s main
transformation pass. We apply hoisting checks to monotonic loops, and
pull loop invariants that do not change throughout the loop, and scalars
to the pre-header of each loop. This pass works on each loop and if there
are inner loops, it handles them first. While iterating our run-time checks
inside each loop including inner loops, we determine if the pointer is
hoistable. If a pointer is hoistable, we place its scalar evolution expres-
sion along with its run-time checks outside the loop, and delete the checks
inside loop.
Inlining Function Calls in the Loop Inlining functions can improve per-
formance, however it can bring more performance degradation due to the
bigger size of the code (runtime checks are called basically at every mem-
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Table 4.2: Summary averages over all benchmarks (first three
columns normalised)
Memory Runtime Dynamic IPC Load D-cache Branch B-cache
footprint (cycles) instructions density MPKI density MPKI
Baseline 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.70 0.28 24.85 0.19 2.85
Store-only 1.22 1.70 2.24 2.17 0.20 12.27 0.15 1.34
Full check 1.23 3.23 5.25 2.54 0.14 5.28 0.17 0.86
ory access). Currently, we only inline bounds checks that are inside loops
to reduce the growth in code size that can be caused by inlining.
4.6 Evaluation
We measured the performance of FRAMER on C benchmarks from
Olden [20], Ptrdist [10], and SPEC CPU 2006 [49], that are commonly
used to evaluate run-time verification for memory safety and compare with
other implementations with many object allocations or intensive pointer
operations. For each benchmark we measured four binary versions: unin-
strumented, only store-checked and full (both load and store checking en-
abled) on FRAMER, and ASan – one of the most widely used sanitizers.
We disabled ASan’s memory leak detection at run-time and halt-on-error
to measure overheads in the same setting as FRAMER. In-frame check-
ing 4.5 was not included for evaluation. Binaries were compiled with the
regular LLVM-clang version 4.0 at optimisation level -O2. Measurements
were taken on an Intel® Xeon® E5-2687W v3 CPU with 132 GB of RAM.
Results were gathered using perf. Table 4.2 summarises the average of
metrics of the baseline and the two instrumented tests.
In this text, cache and branch misses refer to L1 D-cache misses and
branch prediction misses both per 1000 instructions (MPKI), respectively.
4.6.1 Memory Overhead
Our metadata header was a generous 16 bytes per object. The large-frame
array had 48 elements for each 16-frame (division) in use where the ele-
ment size was 8 bytes to hold full address of the header. The header size
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Figure 4.6: Normalised memory footprint (maximum resident set
size)
and the number of elements of each division array can be reduced. Cur-
rently we mandate 16 alignment for compatibility with the llvm.memset
intrinsic function that sometimes assumes this alignment. Despite inflation
of space using larger-than-needed headers and division array entries and
some changes of alignment, we see FRAMER’s space overheads are very
low at 1.22 and 1.23 as shown in Fig. 4.6. These measurements reflect code
inflation for instrumenting both loads and stores.
The memory overheads of FRAMER are low and stable ASan’s aver-
age normalised overheads are 8.84 for the same working set in our experi-
ments, and the highest overhead is 4766% for hmmer. The average memory
overhead of FRAMER is 22% ∼ 23% for both store-only and full check-
ing, and only two tests, perlbench.2 (84%) and yacr2 (116%) recorded
comparably higher growth than other tests. The two tests produce many
small-sized objects, for example, perlbench allocates many 1-byte-sized
















































































Figure 4.7: Normalised runtime overhead
ing a 16-byte-sized header to all the 1-byte-sized objects made the increase
higher. FRAMER’s overheads for those benchmarks are still much lower
than ASan’s: 2808% for perlbench.2 and 714% for yarc2.
4.6.2 Slowdown
Fig. 4.7 reports the slowdown per benchmark (relative number of addi-
tional cycles). The average is 70% for store-only and 223% for full check-
ing. For full-checking, anagram (410%) and ks (452%) stand out for high
overheads despite its smaller program size, mostly due to heavy recur-
sion and excessive allocations causing big growth in executed instructions
(674% for anagram, 812% for ks) as shown in Fig. 4.11, but decreases in
cache misses are moderate (76% for anagram, 81% for ks) compared to
average (decreased by 63%). On contrast, mcf recorded the highest in-
struction overheads (1097%), but cache (91%) and branch misses (92%) are
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Accessheader Accessentry Branch Calculation Untagging
Figure 4.8: Runtime overheads for metadata management and re-
trieval (the overhead for bounds checking excluded)
dropped the biggest among all the tests, so run-time overhead did not grow
in proportion to increased instruction count. perlbench and bzip sets’
overheads are high in both FRAMER and ASan. Both tests produce many
objects, and especially bzip recorded much higher growth in executed in-
structions than perlbench and others.
Performance was impacted far less than would naively be expected from
the additional dynamic instruction count (metric columns 2 and 3 in Ta-
ble 4.2). The rise in IPC (column 4) is quite considerable on average, al-
though the figure varies greatly by benchmark. The original IPC ranged
from 0.22 to 3.20 but after instrumentation there was half as much varia-
tion.
Our slowdown is mainly due to increased dynamic instructions to cal-
culate metadata location. We measured runtime overheads for metadata
management/retrieval of benchmarks with the highest runtime overheads
by forcing or preventing inlining of our hooks. As shown in Fig. 4.8, the
fluctuations in proportion is negligible. Benchmarks with low runtime
overheads showed a similar pattern.
We break down the run-time cost of metadata management/retrieval.





Slowdown is dominated by Calculation (69.66%) – ALU operations to
(1) generate a tag at memory allocation and (2) derive the header address
from the tag and pointer value at memory access. Hardware acceleration in
a future ISA would largely resolve this overhead. We isolated tag-cleaning
from Calculation to show the cost of using tagged pointers without hard-
ware support. Its cost (6.07%) would be removed on current ARM that
ignores top spare bits. The cost of generating tags was negligible, since it
is performed only at allocation. The overhead for bounds checking after
metadata is retrieved is excluded in the measurement, since the overhead
is ALU operations. Including it will increase the proportion of calculation
more.
The remaining three components cannot be resolved with simple ISA
changes. Branches arise in the following cases:
1. if a pointer is tagged or tag-free at memory access
2. if an object is a small or big-framed (i.e. a flag is true/false)
Branch checking for tagged/untagged and small/large-framed con-
tributes 10.19% of the total overheads of metadata management.
Current FRAMER encoding avoided any restriction on object alignment,
however, we are open to manipulate memory manager to remove large-
framed objects for the future design. Accessheader and Accessentry
represent ratios of overheads to access a header and entry, once their ad-
dresses are calculated from tagged pointers. Accessing a header takes more
time than accessing an entry, since it is performed on both types of objects.
Excluding the overhead of arithmetic operations, the cost is around 25% of
that of metadata management and retrieval.
The remaining part of the total runtime overhead that is not included in
the measurement shown in Fig. 4.8 is bounds checking performing arith-
metic operations with loaded metadata, which can be resolved by ISA.
4.6.3 Data Cache Misses
One of the goals of FRAMER is to allow flexible relationships between ob-
ject and header locality to minimise additional cache misses from metadata
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Figure 4.9: Normalised L1 D-cache load misses per 1000 instructions
(MPKI)
access. We do not analyse L1 instruction cache miss rate since this gener-
ally has negligible performance effect on modern processors, despite our
slightly inflated code. To explain the measured increase in IPC we anal-
yse L1 D-cache misses MPKI (cache misses) and branch prediction misses
MPKI. The baseline D-cache miss rate was 2.48% (Table 4.2) but this im-
proves with FRAMER enabled owing to repeated access to the same cache
data.
In Fig. 4.9, we normalise cache misses to the uninstrumented figure. The
average normalised cache misses is 0.66 and 0.38 for store-only and full-
checking, respectively. The miss rate is reduced since the additional oper-
ations we add have high cache affinity which dilutes the underlying miss
rate of the application.
While ASan showed increase for four tests. ASan’s normalised misses


















































Figure 4.10: Normalised L1 D-cache load miss count
overhead is 197% for bc, and two tests reached increase more than by 100%.
On FRAMER, power’s overhead by 48% is mainly caused by the very low
increase in instruction executed in producing MPKI. The misses for the rest
of benchmarks decreased, and normalised misses in full-checking mode
were below 0.5 for 21 tests among 28 working set, whereas only 13 tests on
ASan were lower than 0.5. The overall cache miss rate showed FRAMER is
cache-efficient and stable.
Cache misses (MPKI) appear decreased with bloated instruction counts,
so we also present the increase in total numbers of cache misses. Fig. 4.10
shows the normalised counts of cache misses for programs in SPEC that
are comparably bigger sized than tests in Olden or PtrDist. The averages
of shown tests for FRAMER (Full) and ASan are 1.24 and 2.40, and the
averages for the whole set are 1.40 and 2.31, respectively. This shows the
increase in cache miss count to access metadata in FRAMER is minimal. On
FRAMER, the increase rate of all the tests except one (277% for voronoi)
are below 100%. On ASan, the increases for 7 tests are above 100%, and
bc’s increase rate is 1160%.
4.6.4 Instructions Executed
Fig. 4.11 reports normalised overheads per benchmark. FRAMER increases
dynamic instruction count by 124% for store-only, and 425% for full check-
ing. This increase is the main contributor to slowdown. Dynamic instruc-
tion penalty arises from setting up and using tagged pointers. The major
source of the growth is arithmetic operations. As shown in Fig. 4.8, 75%
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of runtime overhead of metadata management/retrieval is dominated by
calculation of (1) the header address at memory access and (2) the tag at al-
location. This cost can be resolved with hardware acceleration in the future
ISAs.
The penalty of utilising top bits is over-instrumentation – unless individ-
ual memory access is proven tag-free statically, we have to instrument it
(i.e. tag-cleaning) to avoid segmentation fault in all major architectures, re-
quiring the top bits to be zero (or special pointer authentication code in
ARM8). This results in stripping the tag field for untagged pointers.
The average overhead for ASan is 226%, which is lower than FRAMER.
The average excluding the highest test (1336% for bh) is 184%, while
FRAMER’s average excluding the highest (1098% for mcf) is 400%. The
difference in slowdown on average (FRAMER: 213%, ASan: 139%) was not
big as the difference of instruction executed due to FRAMER’s cache effi-
ciency. ASan consumes fewer dynamic instructions, since shadow space-
only metadata storage requires simpler derivation of metadata location,
taking advantage of re-alignment of objects, as trade-off of space and high
locality.
Future implementations can optimise the case where conservative anal-
ysis reveals the tag never needs to be added. More discussion on optimisa-
tion is described in § 4.7.3.
4.6.5 Branch Misses
Additional conditional branches arise in FRAMER from checking whether
small or large frame is used and in the pointer validity checks themselves.
Many approaches using shadow space are relieved from these branches at
metadata retrieval.
As shown in Table 4.2 col 7, the dynamic branch density decreases
slightly under FRAMER instrumentation, but the branch mis-prediction
rate greatly decreases (col 8). The averages of normalised branch misses
for store-only and full-checking are 0.62 and 0.42, respectively. This shows
the additional branches achieve highly accurate branch prediction and that
branch predictors are not being overloaded. Of the new branches added,




























































































Figure 4.11: Normalised dynamic instruction count
dictable owing to the checking code instances being associated with a given
object. And the ones checking pointer validity also predict perfectly since
no out-of-bounds errors are detected in normal operation.
4.7 Discussion
4.7.1 Comparison with Other Approaches
Shadow space-based approaches
Shadow space-based approaches reduce slowdown by lowering executed
instructions. Trade-off of data memory is tolerable in most systems dur-
ing development. For practical deployment, however, their slowdown is
still high and memory footprint is critical in some systems, e.g. small com-
puter running in an embedded system or I/O-heavy server-side loads. In
using shadow space, it is inevitable to pad and re-align objects to avoid
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conflicts in entries [114, 6, 68, 47]. ASan pads each object for wider de-
tection coverage and more padding for alignment, which burdens space,
whereas FRAMER’s fake padding and wrapper frames do not consume
any space. Furthermore, their higher cache misses to access metadata in a
remote memory region (including ASan’s resetting entries at deallocation),
making its runtime overheads unpredictable.
In comparison with ASan, FRAMER showed better efficiency both in
memory footprint (FRAMER: 23%, ASan: 784%) and cache miss counts
overhead (FRAMER: 40%, ASan: 131%). ASan showed lower increase
in runtime overheads (FRAMER: 223%, ASan: 139%), however, 75% of
FRAMER’s overhead of metadata management and retrieval is consumed
for calculation, that can be largely resolved with new ISA. The rest of over-
head comes from bounds checking using loaded metadata, that can be also
implemented as ISA.
SGXBounds
SGXBounds spares 32 bits for a tag among 64 bits, while FRAMER tags only
upper spare 16 bits. SGXBounds’s retrieving an upper bound first, not the
base like FRAMER, may save some overheads if we perform overflow-only
checking. However, using a footer makes systems slightly more vulnerable
to metadata pollution without complete memory safety. For both over/un-
der underflow checking, we do not consider our derivation of the base, not
the upper bound, as a weakness. In addition, frame encoding can be easily
integrated to SGXBounds’ design.
MPX
Intel MPX [53, 87, 99] provides a hardware-accelerated pointer-based
checking instrumented by compiler. In principle, FRAMER could utilize
MPX extensions for performance when used for spatial safety. We showed
FRAMER is more cache-friendly, but it could be made even faster if a
single instruction implemented the complete tag decode operation, split-
ting apart the tagged pointer into an untagged object pointer and separate
header pointer in another register. This would be a fairly simple, register-
to-register instruction, operating on general purpose registers. Since this
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has not used the D-cache, an enhancement would be to compare the pointer
against a bounds limit at hardcoded offset loaded from the header, but the
best design requires further study.
4.7.2 Hardware Implementation of FRAMER
We believe FRAMER’s encoding is at its best when it is implemented as in-
struction set extensions. As mentioned in §4.7.1, the increase in the number
of executed instructions for calculation, the main contributor to slowdown
of FRAMER, can be resolved with new instructions. Tag-cleaning can be
supported by hardware [9]. Moreover, generating a tag and deriving a
metadata address can be implemented as a single operation, respectively.
4.7.3 Additional Optimisations
Utilising More Spare Bits
Currently, we mandate 16-alignment due to llvm.memset intrinsic func-
tion. On this alignment, we have spare 4 bits at the end of offset for
small-framed and another 4 bits in the pointer. (We already have spare
bits for large-framed ones.) Using the bits, we can perform bounds check-
ing only at pointer arithmetic and mark out-of-bounds pointers, so that
we can report errors when they are dereferenced. This way, we expect to
remove duplicated runtime checks, since the pointer may be used for mem-
ory access multiple times. Above this, we can utilise them to encode more
information for better performance.
Compiler Optimisation
Redundant runtime checks can be eliminated using dominator trees. Soft-
Bound [89] reported that their simple dominator-based redundant check
elimination improved performance by 13% and claimed more advanced
elimination [13, 142] can reduce more overheads.
The penalty of using tagged pointers is that unless individual memory
access is proven safe at compile time, we may have to over-instrument mem-
ory access to avoid segmentations faults. Some approaches can save ex-
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pensive runtime checks to reduce performance degradation, bearing false
negatives, but it is difficult in approaches using tagged pointer. We did
not run dedicated pointer-analysis for this version but it can remove over-
instrumentation. Loop optimisation did not show a large impact on reduc-
ing overheads, even for some SPEC benchmarks whose number of hoisted
run-time checks reached hundreds at static time. Our naive optimisation
skipping untagging improved performance more than state-of-the-art loop
hoist pass. Static points-to analysis [121, 123], as long as it does not assume
the absence of memory errors, potentially enables many tags and bounds
checks to be removed at compile time.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter presented FRAMER, a per-object capability system utilising
the currently unused significant bits of pointers to store a tag. A key insight
is that this tag can be bifurcated using a flag bit so that the overwhelmingly
common case of small-framed objects can be dealt with efficiently in terms
of both time and space. This ultimately benefits the performance of excep-
tional large-framed objects too, because the design can special-case them as
well.
FRAMER is evaluated with a case study on spatial memory safety in
C programs. However, we believe its capability design could benefit the
performance of other programming language security mechanisms as well.
Compared to existing approaches, frame-based offset encoding is more flex-
ibile both in metadata association and memory management, while still
offering a fairly simple calculation to map from arbitrary pointers to meta-
data locations. In addition, its intrinsic memory and cache-efficiency make
it potentially attractive for direct hardware support.
5
SpaceMiu: Practical Type Safety
for C
5.1 Overview
There are two major types of spatial memory errors. The first type of spatial
memory errors is widely known as buffer overflows (§ 2.1.1). Another
spatial memory error is type confusion errors where the program accesses a
memory location using an incompatible type (§ 2.2). This chapter focuses on
type confusion vulnerabilities in C.
Type conversions in C are frequently used. Attempts to access a memory
location using a type violating the contract on the memory resource can
cause memory corruption. Figure 5.1 shows one example of unsafe but
widely used type conversion. A pointer p (line 6) is assumed to point to
SubTy-typed data in memory, but it is risky: memory in the location may
hold data in a different type. For instance, if Ty-typed data (line 2) is stored
in the location, sub goes out-of-bounds (line 7). To prevent this, we need
to find the data type, that p points to, in memory, and then check if casting
from the data type to SubTy (line 6) is safe.
In addition, it is challenging to formulate type hierarchy in C language
that heavily weakens and restores types on objects. In Figure 5.1, most
approaches would treat SubTy as Ty’s child (i.e. subtype), and consider
typecasting from SubTy into Ty safe. As for casting from Ty to Y, the poli-
cies differ depending on their view. Ty can be treated as Y’s subtype, since
Ty has the same memory layout as {int; char[5]; char[5];}, which
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1 struct Y {int fval; char ch[5];};
2 struct Ty {int ival; char name[10];};
3 struct SubTy {struct Ty x; struct Y * yp;};
4
5 struct Ty * foo (void * p){
6 struct SubTy* obj= (struct SubTy*)p;
7 struct Y* sub= obj->yp;
8 // do something with sub
9 ...
10 return (struct Ty*)sub;
11 }
Figure 5.1: C example with typecasts
can be interpreted as {struct Y; char[5];}. Our approach allows this
cast, while some other approaches [60] do not. There is a need for balancing
tightness of type rules to minimise false positives/negatives, but still de-
tect memory corruptions via type errors without restricting programmers’
freedom to manipulate pointers.
These memory corruptions are also frequently associated with unions
when parsing data with many different embedded object types in C. This
can trigger security consequences such as out-of-bounds read, code exe-
cution caused by size inconsistency or improperly-parsed file containing
records of different types.
Several approaches [46, 60, 93, 34, 19, 35, 116] have been proposed
to prevent memory corruptions through unsafe typecast. Some of them
[15, 31, 124, 149] are based on vtable pointers, avoiding high overhead of
tracking per-object (or pointer) that has been the bottleneck of practical run-
time verification systems. However the approaches usually perform only
type checking between polymorphic classes so cannot be directly used for
type correctness for C programs.
Some other approaches [60, 46, 93, 57, 35] are based on per-
object/pointer metadata. They can handle a wider range of type errors
by tracking live objects or pointers without breaking binary compatibility
(except fat pointers [11, 57, 93]) however their disadvantage is performance
degradation to manage per-pointer/object type information at run time,
making efficient metadata management for pointer-to-type mapping the key
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to make those solutions practical. In addition, some of them handle only
C++ with class hierarchy.
In this chapter, we present spaceMiu, a run-time type confusion checker
for C programs. Inspired by CCured [93], spaceMiu formulates types in-
cluding unions and type hierarchy in C mimicking up/downcast. Based
on the type relation, we implement a run-time type confusion checker us-
ing our per-object type metadata management and two type descriptors
holding per-type physical memory layout and type relation, respectively.
Our key contributions are as follows:
1. Formulation of type relation and the validity of typecast in C
2. Efficient and scalable per-object information management
3. Evaluation on practical tests
5.2 Types and Type Relations
The first challenge we address is to define what type conversion is safe in
C programs. Many C programs heavily weaken types e.g. at function call,
pointers typecast to a different type (often to void*) from the contracted
type (upcast) and accessed with their original type (desirably) (downcast),
which mimics type hierarchy. We define sub-typing in C based on phys-
ical memory layout in this section, and discuss run-time type confusion
checking in the next section (§5.3).
Technically, C does not support type hierarchy unlike higher-level lan-
guages like C++, C# or Java. Even so, C programmers use structure types
that mimic upcasts and downcasts. Inspired by CCured [93]’s physical equal-
ity and physical sub-typing [116, 22], we define concrete types and their
relation, and adapt them to types supported by LLVM/clang for the C
language.
5.2.1 Type Representation
Firstly, atomic types are a subset of first-class types, whose values are the
only ones which can be produced by LLVM IR instructions [72], and that
can show up anywhere themselves, not just as instances of types. That
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include integers, floating points, pointers, vectors, and register types such
as X86 mmx. We define atomic types as follows, where n and m are non-
negative integers and atomic∗ represents a pointer type:
n := 1 | 8 | 16 | 32 | 48 | 64 | 128
m := 16 | 32 | 64 | 128 | 80
atomic := intn | f pm | vectork | x86 mmx | atomic∗
Figure 5.2: Atomic Types
A vector with an element count k 1 e.g. <4 x int32 > is treated as a first
class type since it is commonly used when multiple other primitive data
(atomic-typed data) are operated in parallel using a single instruction, for
instance, SIMD.
An aggregated type normally refers to an ordered collection of other types
– arrays or structures. We represent it as a list of atomic types and the list
is constructed by using a function π that flattens a type using a constructor
of an empty list (nil) and of non-empty list (::), and append operator t. An
atomic type is a list of itself and an aggregated type is a list of unrolled
fields/elements as follows:
π(void) = nil
π(atomic) = Atomic :: nil
π(struct{τ1 f1; ...; τn fn}) = π(τ1) t ...t π(τn)
π(τ[n]) = π(τ1) t ...t π(τ) (n times)
Figure 5.3: Aggregated Types
5.2.2 Physical Equality
We define type hierarchy using physical equality relation between types in a
list form. Informally speaking, two types τ and τ′ are physically equal, de-
noted by τ ≈ τ′, when their memory layouts are identical. More precisely,
two non-pointer atomic types are physically equal if both sizes and align-
ments are identical as presented in rules (1) ∼ (4) in Figure 5.4. This work
assumes that an atomic type’s size and alignment are the same and the as-
sumption holds in most C standards. Physical equality of aggregated types
1k is a non-negative constant integer.
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is defined based on lists of atomic types: two aggregate types are physi-
cally equal if their ith atomic types are physically equal for all i, as shown
in the rule (5) in Figure 5.4. Pointer types are equal if their reference types
are equal as shown in the rule (6).
(1)
nil ≈ nil
m = n (2)
intm ≈ intn
m = n (3)
f pm ≈ f pn
m = n (4)
f pm ≈ intn
α ≈ α′ τ ≈ τ′ (5)
α :: τ ≈ α′ :: τ′
τ1 ≈ τ2 (6)τ1∗ ≈ τ2∗
Figure 5.4: Physical Equality
Currently we tolerate type conversion between int64 and a pointer type
in 64-bit machines, since the conversion is frequently used, and apply-
ing strict rules to them generated too many errors in our experiments e.g.
perlbench.
5.2.3 Physical Sub-typing and Type Relation
Type hierarchy is defined based on our type relation between two types,
called Physical sub-typing denoted by . We show τ  τ′ by proving that τ
is physically equal to τ′ appended with τ′′, that can be either an empty or
non-empty list of atomic types as follows:
τ′  τ ⇐⇒ ∃τ′′.τ′ ≈ τ t τ′′
When τ  τ′ holds, typecast from τ′ to τ is called upcast, which is con-
sidered safe, and denoted by τ 7−→ τ′. Their pointer cast τ∗ 7−→ τ′∗ is also
safe upcast as presented in the following:
τ′  τ
τ′∗ 7−→ τ∗
On contract, downcast is typecast from τ to τ′ that may cause memory
corruptions.
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A common use of up/downcast is temporarily weakening an arbitrary
pointer to void* given to a callback or function argument, and then cast-
ing back to its original type. A void pointer holds an arbitrary address
and any pointer can be upcast to a void pointer without loss of informa-
tion [61]. void is represented as an empty list, making it an ancestor of any
types. The validity of typecast from an arbitrary pointer (τ* p) to void*
can be derived with rules as shown below:
τ ≈ τ
τ ≈ nil :: τ
τ  void
τ∗ 7−→ void∗
Upcast pointers to void* passed inter-procedurally are normally con-
verted back to their original type i.e. downcast via explicit cast. Unfortu-
nately they may downcast to another type, which requires run-time check-
ing.
In this notion of flattening types to the level of atomics, we may lose
structural information of aggregate types e.g. nested structures or arrays
in structure type. CCured interprets them as arrays of atomic types and
make the type compatibility more relaxed than libcrunch [59] that breaks
an aggregate type down to its immediate sub-types, not to the level of
atomics. In many cases, libcrunch’s sub-typing makes more sense but we
noticed LLVM converts contiguous atomics in an aggregate type to a vector
type, so in this approach we follow CCured’s sub-typing.
5.3 Run-Time Typecast Checking
Upcast is considered safe and this can be verified at compile time: if a
target type of typecast is an ancestor type of the source type, the target
type at runtime is also an ancestor type of the source type.
In contrast, a target type of downcast may mismatch its data type of a
pointer: if a pointer type is a sub-type of a target type at typecast, access
with the pointer after downcast may cause overflows including internal
overflows, hence downcasts require run-time checking to prevent this type
confusion.
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Downcast checking is more challenging than upcast checking, since the
run-time type of a pointer is unknown at compile-time. It requires pointer-
to-type mapping. First of all, we need to track individual objects (or point-
ers) and store per-object (pointer) type information in the database. We
then should map a pointer at a unique offset in the object to a sub-object
(field) corresponding to a nested type.
In summary, we need the following three pieces of information to map a
pointer to its corresponding type at runtime:
1. a pointer’s referent object type
2. an offset that the pointer references in the object
3. type information at the offset
First of all, to manage per-allocation types, spaceMiu leverages
FRAMER’s per-object metadata storage (§ 4.2): each memory object holds its
object type information in a header attached to itself, and an object pointer
is derived to the header location, as described in § 4.2.3. spaceMiu collects
all the types used in a program and assigns a unique ID to each type at
compile time. The current implementation of our main transformation as a
Link Time Optimization (LTO) pass makes it easier to collect all used types
of the whole program. Each header holds an object’s type ID. In addition
to the object type, FRAMER’s tagged-pointer encoding allows us to get an
object’s base address at the same time.
Once obtaining both the type ID and base address of a referent object, we
calculate an offset by subtracting the base address from an object pointer,
and then get a type at the offset using type layout descriptor. Each entry of
the type layout descriptor holds memory layout information of each type
in the form of a list of types at each offset. We retrieve the object type’s
memory layout with the type ID as an index of the descriptor, and get a
nested type with the offset. Pointers are usually mapped to a structure’s
field or array’s element; otherwise we report them as an error.
spaceMiu then examines the validity of type conversion from a type at
the offset (τ) to a target type using a type relation descriptor. If a target type
is τ’s descendent type (physically not equal to and downcast of τ) or totally
incompatible, spaceMiu reports a type confusion error.
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Figure 5.5:Metadata Storage and Type Descriptors
This type confusion checker can be run with other security enforcements
on the shared metadata management such as spatial memory safety (§4.4),
although we did not evaluate in that aspect in this study.
In the following subsections, we describe (1) object-to-type mapping us-
ing per-object metadata management and (2) pointer-to-type mapping and
typecast checking using two type descriptors.
5.3.1 Object-to-type Mapping
Allocated objects in memory are accessed with a known type. The common
three cases are (1) where an object’s type is determined at allocation and
an object is written and read with their declared type. In contrast, there are
cases (2) where an object may be associated with its type after allocation
with delay or (3) where an object is accessed with a different type from its
initial type. We discuss what type is associated with an object and when to
map an object to its type in each case.
(1) The first case is where a memory block is associated with its type at
allocation and holds data in the type. Most static/stack/global objects fall
in this category. We call this type an object’s declared type. Those objects
may be accessed in either their declared type or different type. Different
types are either compatible or incompatible with the declared type.
(2) The second case is heap allocation via malloc family. A heap object
does not have a declared type initially unlike static/global/stack objects.
Instead, it is given its effective type when its pointer is typecast to a known
type at memory write. We categorise heap allocations using malloc into
three as follows:
(a) τ∗ p = malloc (sizeof(τ))
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(b) τ∗ p = malloc (sizeof(τ)× n)
(c) void * p= malloc (n)
Heap allocations (a) and (b) present common forms of allocation with
malloc or customised wrapper functions whose effective type is specified
by programmers. spaceMiu associates these objects with its effective type
at the first typecast from void* to τ∗. Objects of the case (a) as a τ-typed
singleton and those with (b) as a τ-typed array. Although dynamically-
allocated objects are allowed to change their effective type, we assume that
objects in the cases (a) and (b) have one effective type during their lifetime,
and this agrees with most programmers’ habit.
Heap allocation (c) represents a byte array whose effective type is deter-
mined at memory write through string functions such as memcpy. Their
effective type is usually string i.e. a char-typed array. Some byte arrays
may keep being overwritten, being used as a buffer. We treat them as a
buffer that is not associated with any particular effective type, instead of
updating the type. More discussion on this implementation will be pre-
sented in § 5.5.6.
(3) The last case is where objects are given either their declared type
at allocation or effective type at the first typecast, but may hold data in
another type. Unions fall in this category. Stored data is usually in one
of the field types of a union and it is read in the same type as the written
type. However the data can be also read with another type that is not one
of the fields of unions, that requires type checking at run time.
Unions may seem similar to heap objects in the sense that the data type
is determined after allocation, however our approach will treat them differ-
ently. They may not hold data in the same type as its declared (or effective)
type, which is union, and the memory may keep being overwritten with
one of the field types, whereas most heap objects except byte arrays are
assumed to hold data with only one effective type while they are alive.
We separate a union’s stored data type from its first-associated type (de-
clared or effective), which is a union, and call the stored data type a run-
time type (RTT). spaceMiu’s per-object metadata holds both type informa-
tion as shown below:
struct HeaderT {
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int TID; /* Type ID of an element */
unsigned size; /* the raw obj size */
unsigned elemsize; /* an element size for an array
otherwise equal to size */
short isUnionTy; /* if yes 1, otherwise 0 */
short RTTunion; /* Type ID of stored data in union */
};
For unions, spaceMiu stores the type ID of union itself in TID and the
stored data (field) type ID in RTTunion. isUnionTy indicates if the object
is union or not. For non-unions, RTTunion field is not used. Currently
spaceMiu does not handle arrays, so the header form should be modified
to cover arrays. More details on handling unions will be presented in § 5.4.
In summary, we store an object’s declared (or effective) type ID and RTT
ID for unions in an object’s metadata.
5.3.2 Per-object Metadata Management and Pointer-to-Type
Mapping
We leverage per-object metadata management of FRAMER presented in
§ 4.2. The metadata in the header holds an object’s type information – an
object type ID and RTT ID.
In addition to per-object type information, run-time type confusion
checking requires an offset due to operations on pointers such as pointer
arithmetic prior to typecasts to be verified. spaceMiu now performs pointer-
to-type mapping that obtains an offset from the base of an object to a pointer
reference and then maps a pointer at a unique offset to a sub-object’s type
at the offset by utilising a type layout table.
It is straightforward to get an offset in a structure-typed object is in this
approach – simply subtracting an object base from a tag-cleaned pointer.
Now we utilise the type layout descriptor to map the offset in the object
to its corresponding type. Once the object type ID is retrieved from a
header, we directly access a corresponding entry holding per-type physical
layout information in the descriptor with the object type ID as an index.
Each per-type layout information is in the array form, and each element
of the array holds a type ID at a unique offset. Per-type layout contains a
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flattened list of type IDs at each offset as shown in Fig. 5.6a. All the entries
(i.e. arrays) in the layout descriptor are fixed-sized to the last meaningful
offset of a type having the maximum offset, so the element holding the ID
of the type at the offset is also directly accessed with the calculated offset
(we filled a negative integer (-1) in the elements that are not mapped to any











A list for struct VERTEX is obtained by flattening a sub-structure
(struct VEC) as follows, where max is the maximum offset amongst all
the layouts in a program:
{VECid, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 -1, -1,
doubleid, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 -1, -1,
VERTEX∗id,-1, -1, -1, -1, -1 -1, -1,
VERTEX∗id, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 -1, -1,
... up to max}
Here, one offset may be mapped to multiple types in the flattened layout
e.g. a composite-typed field (VEC) and its first field double at the offset
0 in the flattened layout of struct VERTEX. For those cases, we choose
the highest type over sub-objects’ type at the offset, since the type holds its
sub-object information. For instance, at an offset 0 of struct VERTEX, a
type ID of struct VEC is stored, not the ID of double.



















(a) Entry of Layout Table: K is the maximummeaningful oset among all identified types















(b) Entry of Relation Table: the table R is implemented as an L × L
matrix, where L is the number of all identified types in a target pro-
gram. Ench Entry (R [i][j]) holds a boolean value (b(i,j)) representing
if typecast from type τ with ID i to τ′ with ID j is safe or not.
Figure 5.6: Entries of Type Descriptors
5.3.3 Type Confusion Checking
Once a pointer is mapped to a type (τ), we check if type conversion from
τ to a target type (τ′) is safe i.e. if τ′ is physically equal to or upcast of τ.
Now we utilise another type descriptor – type relation table. The relation
table R is implemented as an L× L boolean matrix, where L is the number
of all used types in a target program. Each entry (row) corresponding to
one type τ holds relations between τ and all types. Given two type IDs, i
(source type τ) and j (target type τ′), we directly access the corresponding
element in the table with them. A boolean value (R [i][j]) represents if
typecast from τ to τ′ is safe, as shown in Fig. 5.6b. If R [i][j] is equals to
false, spaceMiu reports a type confusion error.
For instance, spaceMiu found the following error at typecast from
struct op* to struct binop* at offset 48 in the benchmark perl-
bench:
// The syntax, iN, specifies an N-bit integer.
struct op {struct.op*; struct.op*; struct.op* ()*;
i64; i16; i16; i8; i8};
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struct.binop {struct.op*; struct.op*; struct.op* ()*;
i64; i16; i16; i8; i8;
struct.op*; struct.op*;};
5.4 Union Type
As briefly mentioned in § 5.3.1, unions are handled differently from other
types, since their declared (or effective) type differs from its RTT. In this
section, we discuss type safety for unions.
LLVM-clang does not support unions. What happens in practice is that
clang converts a union into a structure. In this text, we call a structure,
generated from a union by LLVM-clang, a union-structure. LLVM-clang
still lets the cases recognisable by naming them with a prefix ”union.”.






LLVM-clang converts the union into the following union-structure:





During the process, clang may drop some fields (int a in this example)
or re-order fields. At memory access to the dropped field, clang generates
typecast of a pointer to the union-structure into the field type.
In LLVM-clang, a union is treated as a piece of memory that is accessed
using implicit pointer casts. It seems similar to a byte array, however there is
a difference: LLVM-clang does not simply create a union-structure having
a byte array which is big enough to contain any user-specified union field.
It creates a union-structure with the right size that meets alignment require-
ment. In the example above, LLVM-clang pulls the most aligned field (int
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* b) to the front, so that the union-structure is aligned by it. It then ap-
pends char c[20] to make the union-structure large enough to hold the
member with the largest size, and discards the redundant member (int
a). It considers both size and alignment to determine what fields are to
be kept and in what order chosen fields should be. At memory access to
the field int a, LLVM-clang performs a cast operation which converts a
union-structure pointer (struct union.Data) into int pointer type.





The union (Data2) is compiled to the following LLVM-IR code:
%union.Data2 = type { [10 x i32], [4 x i8] }
int b[10] becomes the first member, since it is the most aligned mem-
ber of the union, and the shortened i8-typed array (the char array) is ap-
pended to make it the right size.
That is, a union-structure does not hold information of fields that a union
initially has. Hence, given a cast operation from a union-structure into a
certain type in LLVM IR, we cannot distinguish which case the typecast is:
1. generated by LLVM-clang to access its (possibly dropped) field
2. explicitly specified by a programmer.
The validity of static cast from a union-structure into a field type with
the case (1) is examined by the compiler, saving us from typecast checking
at run-time. In contrast, the case (2) needs to be verified by spaceMiu,
however we cannot distinguish the two cases, as mentioned.
We could simply check the validity of any typecast from the union-
structure type into the target type, but there is another point to consider:
there is a mismatch between the declared/effective type (union-structure)
and the type of data (RTT) that is actually stored in the memory location,
as we pointed in § 5.3.1. The declared/effective type (union-structure) and
RTT differ in most cases. The declared/effective type does not change,
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while its RTT can be overwritten multiple times. We could treat the last-
written RTT as their object type, however, we may still need the declared/-
effective type information. It is because typecast from a union-structure
into another incompatible type may have been specified a programmer,
which requires run-time checking. Therefore we keep both type infor-
mation (union-structure and RTT). We update the ID of the object type
(union-structure) at memory allocation, and we keep the RTT ID updated
at memory write to it.
At memory write, a union-structure pointer is first typecast into a certain
type (T), and then writes data in T. At memory read, it is typecast back to
the written data type T (desirably), before reading in T. Both write and read
are through typecast, so run-time operations should be applied differently
depending on the use of the cast – write or read. Instead of analysing uses
of typecast at compile time and hooking differently, for union-structures,
spaceMiu performs run-time checking at memory access, not at typecast.
Firstly, at data write to a union-structure, we update its RTT ID in the
header. The RTT is either (a) one of the field types of an original union or
(b) another type that is not a member of the union. The case (a) will be
then proven safe by spaceMiu’s run-time check at memory write. The case
(b), where a typecast to an incompatible type of a non-field, will be proven
unsafe at run time.
At memory read, we check if it is safe to typecast from RTT, updated
at the last memory write, into the type to be read. To do so, we first
retrieve RTT information from the header, and then prove the compatibility
between the RTT and target type.
Now we define safecast for union-structures. We treat a union-structure
as a special byte array holding any data type, so we perform bounds check-
ing. Here, we also check if alignment of the target type is not larger than
the union-structure, otherwise the alignment difference may cause mem-
ory corruptions. This view is reasonable since memory access to any field
is at the offset 0 by definition of unions.
Given τ (a source type) and τ′ (a target type), where any of them is
a union-structure, safecast for union-structures is defined as presented in
Figure. 5.7:
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Align(τ) ≥ Align(τ′) |τ| ≥ |τ′|
(Union’s safecast)
τ 7−→ τ′
Figure 5.7: Union’s safecast
For union-structures, we instrument memory access to them. Unfortu-
nately, in practice, this causes high performance degradation from meta-
data management and type checking at every memory access. The over-
head can be even larger than spatial memory safety enforcement, whose
cost has been a major challenge.
To avoid runtime overhead, we perform typecasts for unions conserva-
tively – hooking only memory access statically proven to be alias with
union-structures by running points-to analysis. If a pointer operand of
store instruction is an alias, then we hook the instruction to update the
RTT ID for the object at runtime. As for load, we check if the alignment
of the RTT is not smaller than the alignment of the type to be read with.
This instrumentation can cause false negatives or positives. We sacrifice
accurate checking for unions to minimise performance degradation in the
current implementation aiming at an always-on solution. For comprehen-
sive memory/type safety, spaceMiu can be merged with FRAMER’s spatial
memory safety enforcement (§ 4.4), that instruments all memory accesses,
on the same metadata management (§ 4.2). We then can perform operations
for union-structures at memory access by recognising them with metadata
in the header: isUnionTy indicating if the object is a union-structure, as
described in § 5.3.1.
Our current header representation has limitations: it cannot handle other
uses of unions such as union-structure arrays or aggregate types containing
union-structures as fields. More generic and compact representation is
needed to handle various uses of unions.
5.5 spaceMiu Implementation
There are three main parts to our implementation: spaceMiu LLVM passes,
the static library (lib), and the binary lib in the dashed-lined box in Fig. 5.8.

















Figure 5.8: Overall architecture of spaceMiu
The source codes of a target program and our hook functions in the
static lib are first compiled to LLVM intermediate representation (IR). Our
main transformation pass works on the LLVM IR and instruments: (1)
memory allocation/release, (2) pointer typecast, and (3) memory access.
spaceMiu’s main transformation is implemented as an LLVM Link Time
Optimisation (LTO) pass for whole program analysis, and runs as an LTO
pass on gold linker [74], however, incremental compilation is also possible.
Transformation of programs to implement tagged pointers and attaching
a header to objects is the same as FRAMER described in § 4. Customised
compiler optimisations are also previously discussed in § 4.5.
malloc family routines (malloc, realloc) are interposed with our
wrappers defined in the static lib at compile time. calloc is not interposed
at the moment, since we treat allocation with it as an array that we do
not track. The third part is string functions and free interposed at link
time. spaceMiu performs only tag-cleaning for string functions to prevent
segmentation faults. Some of them such as memcpy or strcpy could be
instrumented to update effective types, but we do not implement it in this
implementation. Further discussion will be presented in § 5.5.6.
5.5.1 Creation of Type Descriptors
Before the main transformation pass traverses a program, it statically builds
two type descriptors as presented in § 5.3.2 and § 5.3.3. It is straightforward
to collect all used types of the whole program in our main as an LTO pass.
It then creates the descriptors, layout and relation tables (Fig. 5.6), using
the type IDs statically. The pass first collects all the identified types in
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the target program; assigns each type a unique type ID; and then builds
descriptors with the type IDs. It also assigns unique type IDs to pointer
types of operands of bitcast operations 2, so that we can remove overhead
caused by redirecting entries to pointer types from their non-pointer types
in the type descriptors at run time.
5.5.2 Program Initialisation
We insert a prologue that is performed on program startup. The prologue
reserves address space for the supplementary metadata table and pages are
only allocated on demand.
5.5.3 Memory Allocation
The current version tracks only structures including union-structures (§ 5.4)
- atomics or arrays are not instrumented. Arrays can be handled by merg-
ing spaceMiu and FRAMER, and type information of atomics can be en-
coded in the spare bits in a 64-bit pointer, that spaceMiu and FRAMER do
not currently use (discussed in § 4.7.3), without attaching a header to them
for the future design.
Stack/Global/Static Objects
Our main transformation pass performs similar instrumentation to
FRAMER, presented in § 4.3.2, but updates additional per-object metadata
– type IDs.
For union-typed objects, it turns on the isUnionTy field indicating that
it is an union. The hook then creates a flag and tag (offset or N value), and
moves the pointer to the second field (Ty obj) whose type is the actual
allocated type by the target program.
We optionally instrument function epilogues to reset entries for large-
framed non-static objects. The current implementation does not instrument
epilogues, whereas FRAMER inserts epilogues to detect some dangling
pointers.
2The bitcast instruction in LLVM IR converts a value to a given type without changing
any bits.
5.5 spaceMiu Implementation 109
Heap Objects
spaceMiu’s pass interposes calls to malloc and realloc with our wrap-
pers around them at compile time, while FRAMER interposes them at link
time (§ 4.3.2). Our wrappers call malloc and realloc with a user-defined
size added by the header size; and the rest of operations are the same as the
hook for non-heap objects except mapping objects to their type. Whereas
non-heap objects are mapped to their declared type at allocation, heap ob-
jects are assigned their effective type at pointer casting during pointer as-
signment. Assuming that heap allocations with malloc meet the following
signatures (§ 5.3.1):
Ty * p= malloc (sizeof(Ty));
our main pass searches the first pointer typecasting from void *, re-
turned from malloc, to its target pointer type (Ty *), and passes the tar-
get type ID as an argument to our wrappers around malloc. The pass
may fail to capture the effective type, if a malloc call does not meet the
signatures or LLVM-clang optimises codes. It skips instrumenting the heap
object, when our heuristics cannot detect the effective type.
As for heap allocations with user-customised wrappers around malloc
family, their effective types are determined at call sites to the custom-
wrappers, not to malloc inside them, so the pass lazily updates type
metadata at the calls to the custom-wrappers. This delays object-to-type
mapping longer at run time, and makes it more difficult to handle effec-
tive types, especially to decide whether to instrument malloc called by
custom-wrappers. If our pass captures an effective type at one call to a
user-customised wrapper, it should instrument all the call sites to malloc,
that the custom-wrappers call. In addition, a user-customised wrapper
usually has multiple call sites. Unfortunately this caused more overhead
to track all heap objects including ones not mapped to any meaningful ef-
fective type in our previous experiment. To avoid the overhead, we forced
inlining all custom-wrappers and then performed detecting an effective
type at allocation; and tracking only objects in a type of our interest other-
wise we skipped instrumenting it at inline malloc. The evaluation in § 5.6
is measured on inline custom-wrappers.
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Handling type assignment has been a challenge for run-time type con-
fusion checkers. As for programs in C++, UBSan [124] based on vtable
pointers cannot capture type information of non-polymorphic objects. Ap-
proaches using per-object metadata such as CaVer [69], TypeSan [46], and
HexType [56] instrument the new operator. HexType also detects types of
hard-copying objects that have already been constructed. Libcrunch [60]
handling C assumes a list of signatures like spaceMiu, but captures more
effective types by performing source-level analysis and using debug infor-
mation. One could also utilise a tool such as Coccinelle (semantic patch-
ing) [43] to statically extract effective types or the number of element (for
arrays) by tokenising malloc’s arguments (sizeof (τ) * n) and extracting
two parts of a multiplication.
The current version does not interpose calloc that is assumed to allo-
cate an array in our approach, that we do not track. Therefore we may have
chances to miss a non-array allocation via calloc (sizeof(τ), 1).
We also interpose free with our wrapper but at link time. This performs
resetting an entry for a large-framed object, and releasing the object with
the hidden base (i.e. the address of the header).
5.5.4 Type Cast
spaceMiu’s transformation pass inserts a call to typecast checks right before
each bitcast operation. It statically examines if the target type of typecast
is upcast or downcast of the source type, and instruments only downcast
sites. The pass passes a pointer and the target type ID to a hook along with
addresses to type descriptors and other information needed to calculate the
address of corresponding entries in the tables.
The hook starts with extracting a tag from a pointer: if the pointer is
tagged (i.e. its referent object is instrumented), it performs checking, oth-
erwise it returns. It then gets the header location; retrieves an object’s type
ID; and then performs pointer-to-type and type confusion checking.
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5.5.5 Memory Access
Instrumentation of memory access is similar to FRAMER presented in
§ 4.3.3. The transformation pass instruments basically every memory ac-
cess with a hook function just to clean tag, unlike FRAMER.
As mentioned in § 5.4, updating type information or verifying typecast
of unions are performed at memory access. The main pass runs points-to
analysis for each function and determines if an individual memory access is
alias with any union. If so, the pass hooks memory writes with a function
that updates the type ID for RTT (i.e. the type of store). For memory
reads to unions, it inserts a hook checking if the typecast from the union’s
RTT to the type of load instruction is safe.
5.5.6 String Functions
Tag-cleaning should be also performed on string functions such as memcpy,
memmove or memset in a similar way. We interpose them at link time with
our wrappers, that call wrapped functions with tag-cleaned pointers and
then restore the tag for their return value.
Some string functions such as memcpy and strcpy may be involved
with deciding effective types. We do not implement in that aspect. Further
extension to handle the issue is discussed in § 5.7.2.
5.6 Evaluation
The performance of spaceMiu is measured and evaluated on C bench-
marks from SPEC CPU 2006 [49]. For the benchmarks having multiple tests
(perlbench, bzip2 and gobmk), the average of the tests is presented.
For each benchmark, two binary versions are measured: un-
instrumented and instrumented by spaceMiu. Binaries were compiled with
the regular LLVM-clang version 4.0 at optimisation level -O2. The same
compiler optimisations in the same order are applied to two versions. Mea-
surements were taken on an Intel® Xeon® E5-2687W v3 CPU with 132 GB
of RAM. Results were gathered using perf.











































































Figure 5.10: Normalised runtime overhead
In this text, cache and branch misses refer to L1 D-cache miss counts and
branch prediction misses, respectively.
5.6.1 Memory Overheads
Our metadata header was 16 bytes per structure-typed object. The large-
frame array had 48 elements for each 16-frame (division) in use where the
element size was 8 bytes to hold full address of the header. The header size
and the number of elements of each division array can be reduced. Cur-
rently we mandate 16 alignment for compatibility with the llvm.memset
intrinsic function that sometimes assumes this alignment. Despite inflation
of space using larger-than-needed headers and division array entries and















































































L1 DCache loads L1 DCache misses
Figure 5.12: Normalised L1-D Cache Miss Count Overhead
1.05 as shown in Fig. 5.9. These measurements reflect code inflation for
instrumenting metadata manipulation and typecast checking.
Despite overhead for type descriptors and padding comparably a smaller
object than arrays with a fixed-sized header, the overall overhead is
mainly influenced by increase in number of instrumented objects. One of
perlbench tests with average overhead (5%) reaches 30% with instrumen-
tation of all heap objects excluding space for descriptors. Two tests, gcc
(23%) and gobmk (13%) recorded higher growth than other tests however
it is still low.
The average memory overhead of spaceMiu (5%) instrumenting only
structure-typed objects is lower than tracking global/static/local arrays
and all heap objects for bounds checking (22 ∼ 23% on average). spaceMiu
does not track heap objects whose effective type is not recognised by the
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Figure 5.13: Normalised Branch Miss Count Overhead
main pass (i.e. not following signatures) so many heap objects are dropped
from instrumentation. Amongst tests with heap allocation via customised
wrappers (e.g. perlbench, gcc, and gobmk), forcing inline those wrap-
pers before instrumentation helped detect more effective types in the test
gcc, while inlining was not of much help for perlbench. Many heap
objects were discarded in the test perlbench and tracking all heap alloca-
tion increases the overhead to 23% from 5%. The increase comes from both
object padding and a supplementary table.
5.6.2 Slowdown
spaceMiu’s runtime overhead on average is 26%. We track only structures
that are involved in up/downcast, so tests with a small number of instru-
ments recorded comparably low increase both in memory footprint and
cycles. The slowdown is mainly caused by the increase in executed instruc-
tion to set up tags, clean tags, and perform checks at typecast including
calculation of type information location and retrieval of information.
Slowdown from tag-cleaning and branches is one of the downsides of
using tagged pointers, but much of the overhead will be resolved with cus-
tomised instructions. spaceMiu manipulates tags both at typecast for tag
extraction and memory access for tag-cleaning to avoid segmentation fault.
Tag-cleaning at memory access solely costs around 10% ( > 10% in some
tests) which is heavy for typecast checkers having a better chance for prac-
tical deployment however this can be resolved with hardware acceleration.
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At typecast, spaceMiu extracts a tag from a pointer and checks if the tag
is not zero, that results in additional branches. Removing duplicate op-
erations to clean tags combined with points-to analysis can resolve more
overhead.
gcc (64%) stands out the highest overhead among all the tests, and
perlbench family test (50%) comes second as shown 5.10. Two tests are
the main contributor to raise the average and excluding the two tests, the
average is 17%.
The main contributor in the tests with the highest overhead varies. The
test perlbench heavily typecasts pointers. Checking dominates the over-
head of dynamic instruction count up to 48% excluding the cost of tag-
cleaning (60% including tag-cleaning). In addition, a number of typecast
errors are detected by spaceMiu, so extra branch failures at typecast check-
ing causes more overhead (§ 5.6.5). The test gcc consumes more cycles
on non-heap objects and spaceMiu’s statically removing duplicate runtime
checks using dominator tree and points-to analysis works well on gcc (up
to 60,000 at static time) and this resolved overhead for type checking at
run-time.
Compared to gcc or perlbench, the overhead for the test hmmer is not
high (37%) despite the highest increase in dynamic instruction count (95%)
next to gcc (114%) but higher than perlbench (61%). hmmer’s increases
in L1-Dcache loads and branch loads are 10% and 2% respectively, while
L1-Dcache miss counts and branch misses slightly decreased by 1% and
3%.
5.6.3 Executed Instructions
Fig. 5.11 reports normalised executed instruction overheads per bench-
mark. The increase in dynamic instruction counts is 55% on average.
The increase in executed instructions is the main source of slowdown.
spaceMiu consumes majority of dynamic instructions on (1) setting up
tags at allocation, (2) retrieval of per-object type information; pointer-to-
type mapping; and then type confusion checking, and (3) tag-cleaning at
memory access. Metadata update and typecast checking is also performed
at memory access to unions: updating metadata at store and checking at
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load whose pointer operand is statically identified as an alias with unions.
The cost to check unions was very small on the tests spaceMiu was evalu-
ated on.
The dominant source of the growth is arithmetic operations. The overall
instruction overhead is still not dramatically high, since the occurrences of
pointer typecasts is much lower than that of memory accesses in most pro-
grams, and spaceMiu skips run-time checks on pointers to referent objects
that are not instrumented (i.e. tag-free pointers).
To save untagging operations for the same pointer without using hard-
ware acceleration, we could run static analysis but it was not widely ap-
plied in that aspect in this version. Currently spaceMiu does not perform
inter-procedural analysis for this, so skipping tag-cleaning is applied con-
servatively during optimisation.
As previously mentioned, there are heap objects whose effective type is
not recognised by our compiler pass. It may be more thorough to inter-
pose at allocation at link time and catch it at the first typecast at run time,
assuming that a heap memory object’s effective type does not change. Un-
fortunately we experienced much higher runtime overhead on this imple-
mentation. However it still can be combined with static analysis to find the
first typecast operation in charge of effective type decision.
Future implementation can optimise some cases as discussed in § 5.7.1.
5.6.4 L1 D-cache Misses
L1 D-cache misses arise when accessing an object and its header that do
not fit in one cache line that is normally 64 byte-sized, and for big-framed
objects, an indirect access to the supplementary table. In addition, more
cache misses at access to type descriptors,
Figure 5.12 shows normalised L1 D-cache loads and misses per bench-
mark. The cache misses increased by 4% on average after instrumentation,
while cache loads increased by 9%, so the miss rate went down overall. The
baseline L1 D-cache miss rate was 10.25% and it slightly improves to 9.32%
with spaceMiu enabled owing to repeated access to the same cache data.
Two tests recorded the highest increase in miss count – gobmk (11%) and
perlbench (9%). As for perlbench, the low growth in memory footprint
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(5%), high in executed instructions (61%), high in branch loads and misses
(14% and 11%) tells that the growth in number of instrumented objects
are comparably not high but perlbench is typecast-intensive, requiring
frequent access to type descriptors in a remote region. In contrast, the
memory overhead in the test gobmk is higher than average (13% > 5%)
but the increase in branch loads, cache loads, and executed instructions
are all below average. We can conclude that the higher increase in cache
misses in the test gobmk is dominated by (1) bigger growth in the number
of memory allocation or in bad alignment, and (2) updating metadata of
objects that are not involved in typecasts at allocation.
5.6.5 Branch Prediction
Branches arise to decide whether an object is large-framed or small-framed
at memory allocation of any kind of objects (static, stack, and heap).
spaceMiu also checks if a pointer is tagged to decide if a pointer to be
released at heap memory release via free. In addition, spaceMiu gener-
ates branches at the typecast checking in the followings cases:
1. whether a pointer is tagged
2. whether a pointer is small or large-framed
3. whether a pointer references a meaningful offset in a structure
4. whether the pointer typecast is safe or not.
Checking the validity of pointer typecast generates branch mis-
prediction. As described, we conservatively report unsafe typecasts at run
time e.g. tolerating 64-bit integer to double safe, that can be considered
unsafe from the traditional and strict type safety policies.
As shown in Fig 5.13, branch misses increased slightly after instrumenta-
tion by 4% and branch loads increased by 9%, so the branch mis-prediction
rate slightly decreased. This shows the additional branches achieve highly
accurate branch prediction and that branch predictors are not being over-
loaded. Three tests libquantum (15%), perlbench (14%), and gcc (13%)
recorded the highest overhead. While perlbench and gcc are comparably
big programs instrumenting many objects and cast-intensive, libquantum
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recorded lower overhead in other criteria (memory, executed instructions,
and cache misses) below average. The high branch misses are dominated
by mis-prediction of tagged/untagged pointers and small/large framed
objects.
5.7 Discussion
5.7.1 Effective Type Detection for Heap Objects
To find an effective type of heap allocation with malloc, spaceMiu’s LLVM
pass searches the first typecast of a void pointer to the object into non-
void pointer type as described in § 5.5.3. Under the assumption that the
first typecast follows a call to malloc in the same function, their type infor-
mation can be easily captured, but unfortunately other cases are dropped
from tracking. In addition, instrumenting all heap allocations via cus-
tomised malloc wrappers and lazily updating type metadata can waste
performance to track heap objects whose types are captured. The whole
program analysis using call graphs, dominator tree, and alias analysis can
improve this.
A more accurate way to find effective types of heap allocations is to
capture them at the first typecast at run time, however unfortunately this
causes heavy run-time overhead especially for malloc-intensive programs.
Another way to detect effective types with less overhead but with more
accuracy is to use a preprocessor. We can tokenise malloc’s arguments
(sizeof (τ) * n) by extracting two parts of a multiplication and then asso-
ciate a heap object with its type information, object kind, and the number of
element (for arrays) during the compile time. This is possible to transform
the source code using a tool such as Coccinelle (semantic patching) [43]
that can take those rules.
5.7.2 String Functions and Effective Type
The current implementation to capture effective types may miss some
cases, and one example is buffers whose data is hard-copied with string
functions such as memcpy or strcpy. The effective type is determined at
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1 // Ty is structure type.
2 Ty obj = 55;
3 void* vp = malloc(sizeof Ty);
4 memcpy(vp, &Ty, sizeof Ty);
/* *vp now is Ty typed */
5 Ty* gp = malloc(sizeof *gp);
6 memcpy(gp, &obj, sizeof *gp);
/* *gp now is Ty typed */
Figure 5.14: String functions and eective type
memory copy. In Figure 5.14, memcpy not only changes the values of each
byte of the object, but also determines the object’s effective type. Our pass
can detect the effective type of the object gp, allocated with malloc in the
line 5, but fails for the object vp, since vp’s effective type is determined
by hardcopying (line 4). We can handle this by adding instrumentation of
string functions and modifying our instrumentation of malloc not to skip
instrumenting the heap allocations whose effective types are not captured.
5.7.3 Aliasing Rules
A structure may have void pointers that are involved in typecast as fol-
lows:
1 struct A {void * pa1; T1 * pa2;};
2 struct B {T2 * pb1};
3
4 T2 myt2= {...};
5 struct A a;
6 a.pa1= &myt2;
7 struct B b= (T2*)p->pa1; /* run-time check here */
The contract type of the pointer pa1 is void, but its storage content is
T2 (line 6). With aliasing rules, this cast with void* is illegal in C (except
when the other type is char). spaceMiu reports this cast as an error (line
7) although the cast from the storage content type to a target type is safe
upcast.
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5.7.4 Per-object Metadata Placement
Placing metadata in a header may be more preventive from metadata cor-
ruption through buffer overflows or unsafe typecasts than in a footer espe-
cially on the current 16-alignment. Downcasts and memory over-runs may
be critical, especially for approaches using embedded metadata (e.g. fat
pointers or tagged pointers), since memory writes after unsafe typecasts to
user data in a program’s can pollute metadata in a header of neighboring
objects. Protecting metadata is easier with spaceMiu than with fat point-
ers. We can detect memory overwrites to another object’s header caused by
downcasts by adding FRAMER, that performs bounds checking. Unlike fat
pointers, we do not need to check internal overflows by unsafe downcasts
to protect metadata, since metadata is placed outside an object.
However using a header not a footer has a disadvantage – consuming
branches at memory release via free to decide if a pointer is tagged. If a
pointer is tagged, spaceMiu must move its pointer to a hidden base (i.e. a
header) to free the object, otherwise frees a pointer passed as an argument.
With support of both spatial memory safety and type safety, attaching
metadata at the end of an object is a better implementation for perfor-
mance, otherwise using a header is safer.
5.8 Conclusion
This study presented spaceMiu, that demonstrates how tagged pointers
can be used for run-time type confusion checking for C programs. This
checker implements physical sub-typing for C and pointer-to-type map-
ping and detects unsafe typecasts. Based on FRAMER’s metadata man-
agement, spaceMiu derives a metadata pointer from an object pointer by
exploiting the unused top 16 bits of a 64-bit pointer accesses to its type
layout and relation information with efficient database management.
Memory safety and type safety are highly similar and connected in the
sense that they both require tracking of memory allocation and load/store
addresses to detect safety violations. For both application, the memory
footprint and runtime overhead of the checking needs to be kept low (e.g.
< 5%) so that it can be practically deployed. Type safety enforcement
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is an easier problem since the occurrence of typecast is much lower than
load/store, making type safety more light-weight. Currently spaceMiu is
slightly heavy for an always-on type safety enforcement (> 5%). However
this approach for both memory/type safety could be better with greater







Integrity checking using inline reference monitors to check individual
memory accesses in C/C++ programs remains prohibitively expensive for
practical deployment in the most performance-critical applications. To ad-
dress this, this chapter presents MemPatrol [92], a sideline memory integrity
monitoring system that detects a class of memory corruption attacks with
very low performance overhead, using available Linux kernel primitives
and Intel CPU encryption facilities. MemPatrol aims (i) to guarantee the
eventual detection of integrity violations regardless of the detection delay,
by reliably protecting itself against a compromised application during the
time window between the occurrence of the attack and its eventual detec-
tion, and (ii) to give engineers the flexibility of tuning the cost of integrity
monitoring in a reliable and predictable way by configuring the desired
amount of computational resources allocated to it.
MemPatrol implements a userspace-based isolation mechanism by using
CPU registers as the integrity monitor’s private memory, allowing the mon-
itor to safely run as a thread inside the address space of the protected
application. The CPU registers cannot, obviously, hold all the informa-
tion required to run an integrity monitoring system, such as the addresses
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and expected values of memory locations. However, they are sufficient to
store cryptographic material and run a register-only message authentica-
tion code (MAC) algorithm to reliably access the rest of the data required
for the monitor’s operation.
Attackers in control of a compromised application thread cannot tam-
per with the monitor thread’s information that is offloaded to memory
without detection, because they lack access to the key used to authenticate
it. The authentication key is only available to the integrity monitor, and
threads cannot address each other’s registers. The key and intermediate
states of the MAC algorithm stay only in registers, never being flushed
into userspace memory. The monitor’s code never spills registers and does
not use primitives such as setjmp/longjmp. The registers may only be
flushed to kernel-space memory during a context switch, where they re-
main unreachable to a potentially compromised userspace application. Be-
sides this main idea, this chapter discusses how MemPatrol prevents re-
play attacks, and the mechanisms based on SELinux and the clone Linux
system call which are required to protect the monitor thread from forced
termination by its parent process using kill or modification of its code
memory to alter its execution.
This work studies a concrete special case of sideline integrity monitoring
for detecting heap buffer overflows in a commercial high-performance pas-
sive network monitoring system [96] where existing memory safety tech-
niques are too expensive to apply. We believe, however, that periodic in-
tegrity checking of memory locations in a program’s memory can have
additional applications. For example, it could be used to detect malicious
hooks installed by modifying persistent function pointers.
Of course, even a concurrent monitoring system incurs performance
overhead that may affect application threads, for example, memory band-
width overhead from increased reads, cache coherency overhead, and other
cross-CPU communication in NUMA systems. The low overhead imposed
by our isolation mechanism, however, enables engineers to minimize mon-
itoring cost arbitrarily by throttling integrity monitoring without compro-
mising eventual detection.
In summary, MemPatrol make the following contributions:
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1. An effective, userspace-based isolation mechanism for the monitor
thread that does not require new Linux kernel modifications
2. Demonstration of tunable and predictable allocation of resources to
security monitoring, in particular memory bandwidth
3. Avoidance of synchronization overhead for heap monitoring by
taking advantage of the memory allocation mechanisms used in
performance-critical systems
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 de-
scribes our threat model. Section 6.3 presents our monitor thread isolation
mechanism. Section 6.4 applies our mechanism to monitoring of heap in-
tegrity, and Section 6.5 evaluates its performance. Section 6.6 reviews dis-
cussion for the better design, and Section 6.7 concludes with final remarks
on the current limitations and future directions of this work.
6.2 Threat Model
In this section we discuss MemPatrol’s threat model. Firstly, we discuss the
threat model for integrity monitoring using a concurrent thread in general.
Secondly, we discuss the threat model for heap memory corruption attacks
that we use as a concrete case study of integrity monitoring.
6.2.1 Sideline Integrity Monitoring
MemPatrol’s threat model for integrity monitoring, in general, considers at-
tacks as malicious modification of memory contents, whether on the stack,
heap, or static variables. It divides the life cycle of a protected application
into two phases: the trusted and the untrusted phase. MemPatrol assumes
the program starts in the trusted phase, during which the application is
responsible for registering all memory locations to be monitored and then
launching the monitor. The program, then, enters its untrusted phase be-
fore the application receives any inputs from potentially malicious third
parties that could compromise it.
This work assumes that at some point after entering the untrusted phase
of its lifetime, the application becomes vulnerable, for example, by starting
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to process external input. After this point, it is no longer trusted by the
monitor that was launched before the process became vulnerable. In par-
ticular, we assume that a compromised process may access any memory
location that lies in its address space, and may attempt to restore any data
corrupted during the attack leading to the compromise, in order to avoid
detection. A compromised process may also invoke any system calls, such
as kill, to terminate other processes or threads, subject to OS controls.
Attacks against the OS kernel, however, are outside the scope of this work.
Finally, while the application is under the control of the attacker, we as-
sume the attacker may perform replay attacks, meaning that older contents
of the memory can be saved and reused to overwrite later contents.
6.2.2 Heap Integrity
We built a concrete case study of MemPatrol by applying it to heap buffer
overflow detection based on detecting canary data modifications, and eval-
uated it with a high-performance passive network monitoring system [96].
Other threats such as stack-based buffer overflows are handled by exist-
ing defences, such as GCC’s stack protector (-fstack-protector set of
options), or fall outside the scope of this case study.
The program is assumed to be compromised through heap buffer over-
flows employing only contiguous overwrites. Buffer overflows often belong
to this category, and we do not consider other memory safety violations,
such as those enabling corruption of arbitrary memory locations.
The attacker may corrupt any kind of data in heap objects by overruns
across adjacent memory chunks. For instance, attackers can overwrite a
function pointer, virtual function table pointer or inlined metadata of a
free-list-based memory allocator by overflows. MemPatrol assumes that
attackers may overwrite contents across multiple buffers in both directions,
i.e. underflows and overflows.
Finally, MemPatrol assumes that the canary value cannot be learned
through memory disclosure 1 attacks [44, 48, 27]. However, note that the stan-
1Memory disclosure is one of the common information leak vulnerabilities. It occurs
when a system forgets to clear a memory block before using it to construct a message
that is sent to an untrusted party.
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dard form of memory disclosure attack is impractical with passive network
monitoring systems, such as [96], because there is no request-response in-
teraction with an attacker to exfiltrate the data. An “indirect” elaboration
of the attack is conceivable, that caches the contents of the canary to an-
other buffer inside the process, used later to restore the canary. For this
to work, the copy must not corrupt another canary, so it must be achieved
using random access, which the current solution does not cover. These
attacks are outside the scope of this case study.
In summary, we assume the attacker can gain control of the execution
of the application through heap buffer overflows, but we cannot defend
against overflows that stride over heap canaries without overwriting them,
other kinds of memory safety violations, or against information leakage
through memory disclosure attacks.
6.3 Monitor Thread Isolation
Sideline integrity monitoring systems offer asynchronous detection with a
delay. Crucially, if this detection latency can be exploited to disable the
monitor, no concrete security guarantees can be made. To avoid this, we
need to anticipate all possible scenarios under which a compromised ap-
plication can disrupt the monitor thread, and thwart them. This work has
identified the following ways that an attacker with full control of the ap-
plication can disrupt a monitor thread running in the same address space:
1. Tampering with the monitor’s data structures on heap or its stack
2. Hijacking the control flow of the monitor by manipulating the moni-
tor thread’s stack
3. Hijacking the control flow of the monitor by altering the monitor
thread’s executable code in memory
4. Terminating the monitor thread via the kill system call
5. Faking application termination
In the following sections, we discuss how to block these attacks.
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Figure 6.1: The cryptographic key is only accessible to the monitor
thread by storing it in a register, and additional informa-
tion stored in memory is authenticated cryptographically.
6.3.1 Protection of Data Structures in Memory
Attackers may attempt to subvert the monitor thread by corrupting data
in the program’s memory used by the monitor, such as the list of memory
locations to monitor. This would effectively disable monitoring. Besides
these data structures that are stored on the heap, an attacker could alter
local variables or spilled registers on the stack of the monitor thread.
This solution is for the monitor thread to only trust data in its registers.
Of course not all data can be saved in the register file due to the limited
space of registers. Instead, any data stored outside of registers must be
authenticated to prevent tampering. MemPatrol achieves this using cryp-
tographic techniques. The cryptographic key used for authentication is
stored only in a register as shown in Figure 6.1. Compromised application
threads cannot succeed in corrupting data without detection, because they
do not have access to the cryptographic key required for counterfeiting the
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stored information. Of course, it is not sufficient to merely protect the key
in a register. It is also required that the entire authentication mechanism
is implemented using only registers, and that the main loop of the mon-
itor thread also only trusts registers and authenticates any memory used.
Next, we describe the memory authentication primitives and the method-
ology followed to implement the monitor code using only registers for its
trusted data instead of memory.
Authenticated Memory Accesses
To secure data stored in untrusted memory from being counterfeited, we
use AES-based Message Authentication Codes (MAC) to sign the value
and its location. This work chose AES because we can utilize the AES-NI
[45] instruction set of Intel processors which provides a hardware imple-
mentation of AES using the aesenc and aesenclast instructions for the
encryption operation. Each of them performs an entire AES round with-
out any access to RAM. MemPatrol uses the compiler’s intrinsics to access
these instructions. Note however that these hardware extensions are used
in this work for convenience and performance. In principle, our solution
does not depend on the availability of dedicated cryptographic instruc-
tions, as CPU-only implementations of AES on processors without AES-NI
exist [117].
Every AES round requires a different round-specific key expanded from
the initial key. These are typically expanded once and stored in a memory-
based array and reused for every operation. We cannot use a memory-
based table and we also dedicate using 10 registers, one for each round’s
key, by interleaving the key expansion with the encryption rounds. This
technique cannot be used with decryption, because decryption requires
the expanded key in reverse order, so all the stages would have to be kept
in registers. Fortunately, the decryption operation is not required for im-
plementing message authentication codes.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the authenticated memory access routines used by
the monitor thread. The routines can store and load data in units of 64-bits
expanded into 256 bits of memory, namely the sec64_t type that includes
the value and its signature. Specifically, we pack the 64-bit address of the
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typedef struct {
__m128i m; /* Data word and its (albeit redundant) address */
__m128i mac; /* Message authentication code */
} sec64_t;
/* Store a verifiable word */
void store_sec64(uint64_t word, sec64_t *sec, __m128i key);
/* Return a verified word or execute an illegal instruction */
uint64_t load_sec64(sec64_t *sec, __m128i key);
Figure 6.2: Untrusted-memory data type and access routines
sec64_t object and the 64-bit value into 128 bits of data, and produce an
additional 128-bits of MAC by encrypting the concatenation of the address
and value using the key with the help of the store_sec64 routine.
To retrieve the value, the load_sec64 routine regenerates the signature
using the address of the sec64_t passed to it, the value from the sec64_t,
and the key passed to it in a register. If the signature does not match, it
raises a trap, otherwise it returns the value.
Replay Attacks
To block attackers from maliciously overwriting an entry with a signed da-
tum from a different memory location, we include the memory address in
the authenticated data. To block attackers from reusing signed data rep-
resenting previous values of the same memory location, we avoid storing
new data to the same address. Note, however, that we can enable a limited
form of secure updates by using append-only tables and keeping the table
size in a register.
Writing Register-only Code
While it is entirely possible to implement the monitor thread in assem-
bler by hand, we found that this was not necessary. Here we describe the
methodology used to achieve the same result and to verify its correctness.
First, we isolated the code that must avoid using unauthenticated mem-
ory into its own source file, compiled with a controlled set of GCC options,
and manually inspected the generated assembly. Initially we attempted to
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instruct GCC to use specific registers by using asm annotations on variable
definitions. This achieved control of the registers used, but unfortunately
it generated memory accesses for superfluous temporaries. Instead, we
had to rely on GCC eliminating register usage through optimization, by
compiling the code with -O3 (and also -msse4 -maes for SSE2 and AES-
NI). Using stock AES-NI routine implementations for the MAC routines
produced code with register spilling. Obviously these routines must not
use any memory, as they are the ones that we rely on for authenticating
memory use elsewhere. This is addressed by modifying the stock encryp-
tion routines to interleave the round-key generation with the encryption
rounds. This was sufficient for implementing a MAC algorithm and the
memory access routines.
Next, we worked in a similar way on the register-only implementation of
the main loop of the monitor thread. Functions calls could not be used, be-
cause they would use the stack to save their return address and temporary
variables from registers, so we placed the previously crafted store_sec64
and load_sec64 routines in a header file and annotated them with the
always_inline GCC attribute. After some experimentation, the desired
code was achieved. Of course, the solution does not rely on these tech-
niques, as we could always write the core routines of the system directly in
assembler.
Finally, besides manual verification of the generated assembly code, we
zero out the rsp register at the start of the integrity checking loop using in-
line assembly, forcing any stack frame access to cause a crash. This ensures
we do not accidentally introduce memory accesses due to spilled local or
temporary variables as the code evolves, or in subsequent recompilations.
6.3.2 Protection of Code
Another way the application’s threads can subvert the monitor thread is
by modifying its executable code in memory while it runs. On x86 there
is no need to flush instruction caches for program memory modifications
like this to take effect. Code segments are write-protected by default, but
attackers in control of the process could easily call mprotect on a vanilla
Linux kernel to gain write access to the code section of the monitor thread.
132
MemPatrol: Reliable Sideline Integrity Monitoring for High-Performance
Systems
They could then neutralize the monitor thread without causing it to exit by
replacing its code with a version that does not perform integrity checks.
With a vanilla Linux kernel, this attack is entirely possible. However, so-
lutions to prevent the modification of program code are already included
in most Linux distributions. For example, the PaX project introduced
MPROTECT[101], a kernel patch designed to prevent the introduction of
new executable code into the task’s address space by restricting the mmap
and mprotect interfaces. Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [113] also
contains the execmem access control, to prevent processes from creating
memory regions that are writable and executable. One of these common
solutions needs to be used to prevent this attack. We use Red Hat Enter-
prise Linux which provides SELinux.
6.3.3 Terminating or Tracing the Monitor Thread
A trivial attack scenario that must be tackled is termination of the monitor
thread by the compromised process using the kill system call, or subvert-
ing it using ptrace 2. We address this scenario by using the Linux clone
system call which allows fine-grained control over sharing parts of the ex-
ecution context. We start the application as a privileged user and, instead
of the regular POSIX thread interfaces, we use clone with the CLONE_VM
flag to create the monitor thread. After the monitor thread is launched, the
main application drops its privileges by executing setuid and setgid.
This results in two threads/processes (the distinction between thread and
process is not so clear when using clone) running in the same address
space without sharing user credentials. The monitor thread retains the
privileged user credentials, while the rest of the application is running with
reduced privileges, and thus cannot use the kill system call to signal the
privileged thread, nor ptrace to debug it.
2With the ptrace system call, one process (a tracer) can pause another process (a tracee),
inspect and set the tracee’s registers and memory, or intercept system calls. It is used
to implement breakpoint debugging and system call tracing.
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6.3.4 Faking Application Termination
Under this scenario the attacker may call exit in order to terminate the
process before the monitor thread had a chance to detect the attack. Unini-
tiated termination of the application process could be considered sufficient
grounds for raising an alarm, but we also address this scenario by ensuring
that a final integrity scan is performed on exit.
6.3.5 Detection of Normal and Abnormal Termination
The monitoring system needs to detect normal application termination, in
order to also terminate, as well as abnormal termination triggered by a
MAC failure in order to raise an alarm.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to receive notification of the termina-
tion of the process by a signal through the prctl mechanism with the
PR_SET_PDEATHSIG option, because of the different user credentials used
for isolation with the explicit purpose of disallowing signals. Instead, the
monitor needs to detect the termination of its application by polling its
parent PID using kill with a signal number of 0.
As we have discussed, the execution of the monitor thread is severely
constrained, to the extent that calling the libc wrapper for kill can com-
promise it by dereferencing the return address saved on the stack. It is
technically possible to send a signal to another process in a safe manner on
x86 Linux by running the syscall machine instruction directly. It accepts
its input parameters in registers and stores the return address in a register.
However, it is more convenient to use a more flexible scheme described
next.
To detect termination, we use an additional monitor process, spawned as
a child of the monitor thread using the normal fork mechanism. Unlike
the monitor thread, this process does not share its address space with the
monitored application. Therefore it is free of the draconian execution con-
straints imposed on the monitor thread. This process can poll the main
application using kill in a loop to detect its termination and signal the
monitor thread, which is possible, as they are running under the same UID.
The monitor thread must perform a final integrity check of the application
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before exiting, to handle the possibility of a process termination initiated
by the attacker, as discussed earlier.
As for abnormal termination, once the monitor thread detects an in-
tegrity violation, it has limited options due to its constraints. We call the
__builtin_trap intrinsic instruction which on x86 Linux compiles to an
illegal instruction and generates a SIGILL signal, terminating the monitor
thread. The termination is detected by the monitor process, which has the
flexibility required to alert operators.
6.3.6 Minimizing Performance Impact
The execution of a concurrent monitor thread, unlike inline reference mon-
itors, does not increase the dynamic instruction count of the monitored
program’s threads. However, its presence may still incur other kinds of
overheads affecting them including cache pollution, memory bandwidth
increases, and cross-CPU communication.
To minimize last-level cache pollution, we ensure that the monitor thread
is using non-temporal memory accesses, which are available to C code by
using the __builtin_prefetch intrinsic. Unlike inline monitoring, re-
fraining from cache use only affects the performance of the monitor thread
itself, which translates to detection delays, rather than slow down of appli-
cation threads.
Moreover, network monitoring systems go to great lengths to avoid pag-
ing overheads because the jitter introduced to execution time by having to
walk the page tables on a miss may lead to packet loss. For example, they
utilize so-called huge pages introduced in modern processors, typically
sized at 2 MiB or 1 GiB instead of the default page size of 4 KiB on x86. We
additionally avoid any such overhead by sharing the entire address space,
page tables included, with the monitored threads.
To avoid hogging memory bandwidth and minimize cross-CPU commu-
nications, the monitor thread should pace its memory accesses. In fact, we
allow the rate of memory accesses to be configurable as a means to allow
the user to select the desired level of overhead, at the expense of detection
delay. This allows the user to tune for minimal impact on the application
threads.
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In summary, we explore a set of design trade-offs to avoid overhead to
the application threads at the cost of the monitor thread’s speed. This
highlights the importance of protecting the monitor thread itself so that
this trade-off does not result in invalidating the approach.
6.3.7 Limitations
This approach assumes attackers change the behavior of a monitor by ex-
ploiting corruption on data that the monitor uses. Hence, we do not cover
other heap exploits of memory writes, for example, heap spraying or JIT
spraying filling the heap with many objects containing malicious code, and
increasing the success rate of an exploit that jumps to a location which
can then be pointed to and triggered. Attacks, not directly meddling with
a monitor’s data or code, are not covered, so spraying attacks should be
handled with other defenses [107, 136]. For wider protection of critical
control-flow and data-flow variables in memory, one can use control-flow
protection mechanisms (discussed in § 2.3) such as Cryptographically En-
forced CFI (CCFI) [78]. CCFI also leverages cryptographic primitives to
protect control-flow information such as return addresses, function point-
ers, and vtable pointers. Compared to MemPatrol, CCFI offers comprehen-
sive protection against control flow violations but does not protect against
some non-control-flow data corruptions that MemPatrol can detect. More-
over, CCFI is an inline solution, hence it directly affects the performance of
the application threads (3–18% decrease in server request rate).
As mentioned in § 6.2.2, information leakage attacks, allowing reading
and disclosure of the canary values, are not handled for general purposes
other than our case study for passive network monitoring systems.
6.4 Case Study: Heap Integrity
Heap canaries can be used for detecting heap buffer overflows. They are
fashioned after stack-based canaries and work in a similar way. Typically
the canaries are checked on deallocation, which for our use case would
lead to frequent checking and overhead to the main application threads for
short-lived objects, or excessive detection delays for long-lived ones.
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As a case study of integrity monitoring, we apply MemPatrol to canary-
based heap integrity checking. We use the monitor thread to patrol heap
buffers, and detect illegal memory overwrites across boundaries between
heap objects by checking corruption of canary values placed strategically
between heap-allocated objects. In this section we describe our implemen-
tation of sideline integrity checking for heap canaries.
6.4.1 Memory Pools
To check heap canaries, the monitor needs to keep track of heap allocations.
Existing sideline heap buffer overflow detection systems achieve this by
intercepting heap allocation functions to track live heap buffers and collect
the addresses and sizes of live heap buffers. This can be a significant source
of overhead, slowing down the main application threads.
High-performance applications typically use fixed-sized memory pools for
performance, such as the memory pool library for network monitoring sys-
tems provided by the DPDK [51] toolkit. Memory pools is the use of
fixed-sized memory blocks (pools) for memory management that allows
dynamic memory allocation. The allocator preallocates memory pools, al-
locates, accesses, and frees blocks represented by handles at run time.
We designed our monitoring system to take full advantage of such mem-
ory pools. Instead of tracking individual object allocations, we track infor-
mation at the granularity of memory pools: the base address of each pool,
the number of blocks, and the size of a block in the pool are included in
an entry and added to the append-only table used by the monitor thread.
This enables the bulk setup of heap canaries before their use in the fast path
of the program. Memory pools also enable reusing canaries between allo-
cation lifetimes (since typically the object size is fixed per memory pool).
Such canary recycling eliminates synchronization overhead suffered by ex-
isting solutions designed around a malloc-style arbitrary object size inter-
face.
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6.4.2 Integration with the Monitored Application
MemPatrol is implemented in the form of a library offering an API for in-
tegration with applications. To use MemPatrol the application needs to
augment its memory pool implementation with canary objects. These
are defined in the MemPatrol library by the canary_t type. The mon-
itored application is responsible for registering all its canaries using the
patrol_register function provided by our library. This integration ef-
fort is similar to what is required for using debugging solutions such as
Google’s AddressSanitizer [114] with custom memory allocation schemes.
In the current implementation, all canaries must be registered before
the application enters its untrusted execution phase, signified by starting
the monitor thread with the patrol_start function and dropping its
privileges. Figure 6.3 illustrates the API used by the application to integrate
with MemPatrol.
typedef int8_t canary_t[16]; // Data type for canaries
void patrol_init(void); // Called at system startup
// Used for registering canary locations
void patrol_register(void *base, size_t stride, size_t count);
void patrol_start(int cpu); // Start monitoring
Figure 6.3: Canary-monitoring integration API
Upon calling the patrol_register function, the value of the base ad-
dress as a 64-bit integer and the values of the pool’s object size and object
count, as 32-bit integers concatenated into a 64-bit integer, are stored in a
table using two sec64_t entries generated using the store_sec64 func-
tion. The monitor thread has not been started yet, so the key, generated by
the patrol_init function on program startup, is temporarily stored in
memory inside the MemPatrol library.
Once the patrol_start function is called, it loads the key into a regis-
ter, zeroes out the copy in memory, and launches the monitor thread. The
number of table entries is also kept in a register to prevent it from being
tampered to trick the monitor into ignoring table entries.
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Figure 6.4: Secure canary checking
6.4.3 Cryptographically Generated Canary Values
Some existing approaches [95] using random-valued canaries safely store
the original copies in the kernel or a hypervisor. In our technique, we gen-
erate canaries using cryptographic techniques to prevent attackers from
inferring the original canary values and recovering them to prevent detec-
tion after a compromise. We use 128-bits for a canary, storing a MAC of
the address of the canary. Unlike using random canary values, this does
not require storing copies of canary values for comparison.
Since possibly-compromised threads of the application do not have ac-
cess to the key, even if attackers succeed in exploitation through heap buffer
overflows, they cannot recover the overwritten canary’s expected value.
The overall checking procedure is illustrated in Figure 6.4.
We place one canary at the end of each block. Memory blocks are typ-
ically padded to match a requested alignment. This has to be done after
the addition of the canary size to the allocation size. There is a choice on
whether to place the canary back-to-back with the actual object, or to align
the canary in memory. We chose to pack canaries tightly, to detect even
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small, accidental heap buffer overflows and to save memory, at the cost of
unaligned memory accesses from the monitor thread.
6.4.4 Canary Recycling
The integrity monitor does not have to track the life cycle of each heap
buffer. This is possible since the location and values of canaries are fixed
throughout the execution of the program, thanks to the fixed size of pool
elements. This allows us to setup all canaries during the memory pool’s
initialization, and avoid updates on every individual block’s deallocation
and reuse.
With such canary recycling, blocks with a corrupted canary may be
returned to the pool before being checked by the monitor, and later re-
allocated. The monitor, however, will eventually inspect the canary and
detect the violation, even if the affected objects have been deallocated.
Canary recycling eliminates the communication overheads, but on the
other hand, this approach incurs the burden of scanning all blocks of the
memory pool, whether they are currently occupied or not. This has the
effect of increasing the detection delay but is not a serious problem with
appropriately provisioned memory pools.
6.5 Evaluation
We evaluated MemPatrol’s performance by running in alongside it with
NCORE [96], a proprietary Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) system, and run-
ning experiments using high bandwidth network traffic.
6.5.1 Integration with NCORE
We modified NCORE’s memory pool library to reserve 16 bytes for one
canary at the end of each block, and to call patrol_register when the
memory pool is created to register all its canaries. Each canary also helps
protect against buffer underflows in the next block. NCORE does not store
allocator metadata between blocks, but stores free-list pointers at the start
of free blocks. These are protected since canaries are active even when
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their block is free. Finally, we added a call to the MemPatrol initialization
routine (patrol_init) at the beginning of NCORE’s startup, and a call
to MemPatrol’s monitor thread launching routine (patrol_start) after
the NCORE has initialized but before it drops privileges. The system’s
memory pools are initialized between these two calls.
6.5.2 Experimental Results
We ran NCORE on an iXsystems Mercury server with 2 Intel(R) Xeon(R)
E5-2690 v4 CPUs, nominally clocked at 2.60 GHz (but running at 3.20 GHz
thanks to Turbo Boost) with HyperThreads enabled and 256 GiB of RAM
at 2133 MHz distributed over all four memory channels of the two CPUs.
This system has 56 logical cores, out of which NCORE was configured to
use 41 logical cores for pattern matching, and 5 logical cores for packet cap-
ture and internal load balancing, with their sibling logical cores left idle to
avoid interference. One logical core on the first CPU was assigned to the
MemPatrol monitor thread, and one physical core per CPU (4 logical cores
in total) was left for general purpose use, such as user shells and OS ser-
vices. We configured NCORE for a pattern matching workload inspecting
all network traffic against a list of 5 million random substring patterns with
an average pattern length of 100 bytes.
Space Overhead
After launch, NCORE had registered 203 million heap canaries in 120 con-
tiguous ranges. Thanks to memory pools, the overhead of metadata kept
for each contiguous range of canaries is low. Also, the system used 129
GB of heap memory for objects and their canaries. Thus the average object
size without canaries is 619 bytes, and the 16 bytes used for each canary
amount to a memory overhead of 3.25 GB or 2.58%.
CPU Overhead
We used another iXsystems server as a traffic generator replaying a 650 MB
real traffic trace with a tool that rewrites the IP addresses on the fly to sim-
ulate an unlimited supply of flows. To evaluate the performance overhead,
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Table 6.1: Cache hit rates for dierent types of application threads
and dierent temporal locality hints used by the monitor
thread.
RX Workers Patrol
L3 Hit L2 Hit L3 Hit L2 Hit L3 Hit L2 Hit
No Patrol 0.31 0.10 0.64 0.66
Prefetch 0 0.31 0.10 0.62 0.66 0.00 0.00
No Prefetch 0.30 0.10 0.59 0.66 0.00 0.00
Prefetch 3 0.30 0.10 0.60 0.66 0.00 0.00
we generated traffic at the rate of 50 Gb/s at 9.3 M packets/s and 170 K
bidirectional flows/s. Under this load, the baseline NCORE without Mem-
Patrol had 77% CPU utilization on the pattern matching cores. The traffic
capture cores are constantly polling a network interface so are always at
100% utilization irrespective of actual load. There was no packet loss ob-
served in this baseline setup. We repeated the experiment with the monitor
thread running, and observed no increase in CPU utilization, with packet
loss also remaining zero. By running on a separate core and performing
non-temporal memory accesses, MemPatrol did not interfere with the in-
struction count of the application’s processing threads.
Cache Overhead
We used the Intel Performance Counter Monitor (PCM) tool [138] to mea-
sure the cache hit rates on each logical core. The results are shown in
Table 6.1. We show separate results for the traffic capture threads (RX),
the pattern matching threads (Workers) and the monitor thread (Patrol).
The first row is the baseline without the monitor thread. The second row
shows the results with the monitor thread running and using non-temporal
memory accesses. We observe that there is a small decrease of the L3 cache
hit rate. If we disable the non-temporal memory access hinting, or in-
stead we specify a high degree of temporal locality using the value 3 to the
third argument of the GCC prefetch intrinsic, we measure a slightly higher
degradation. We further get confirmation that it worked adding the hints
for non-temporal memory access to the monitor thread by observing that
its cache hit rate is zero.
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System Read Throughput (%)
Figure 6.5: Relation between system read throughput and maximum
detection latency (time to scan all canaries). The user can
select the trade-o by controlling the number of pause in-
structions inserted to throle the monitor thread.
Memory Bandwidth Overhead
Subsequently, we used the PCM tool to measure the system memory
throughput. The measurement was done over a 60 second interval to
smooth out variations. As expected, there was no impact on the memory
write throughput, but we could observe the effects of the patrol thread on
the system’s memory read throughput: An 18.1% increase over the baseline
read throughput of 15.5 GB/s.
Detection Delay
Running at full speed, MemPatrol required 5 seconds to scan all 203 million
canaries. This corresponds to the worst-case detection delay after the cor-
ruption of a canary. We confirmed the detection capability end-to-end by
introducing an artificial buffer overflow.
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Table 6.2: Eects of the NUMA placement of the monitor thread on
the detection latency and local/remote memory bandwidth
of the monitor thread’s core.
Monitored Sockets
Both Local Remote
#Canaries 203, 159, 920 76, 184, 970 126, 974, 950
Scan Duration (µs) 5, 151, 152 1, 865, 777 3, 553, 998
#Canaries/µs 39.4 40.8 35.7
Remote Memory Bandwidth 1, 576 0 3, 339
Local Memory Bandwidth 915 3, 399 0.1
Overhead Control
Next, we ran experiments to demonstrate control of the overhead by
trading-off detection latency. We slowed down the monitor thread by
a configurable amount by adding pause hardware instructions (via the
_mm_pause compiler intrinsic). Figure 6.5 illustrates the effect of different
delays determined by the number of additional pause instructions exe-
cuted in each iteration of MemPatrol’s monitoring loop that is checking
one canary. Insertion of a single delay instruction results in a sharp drop
of the read throughput overhead from 18.1% to 5.2% and a roughly pro-
portional increase in detection latency from 5 to 17.7 seconds. By further
tweaking the number of pause instructions we can bring down the mem-
ory throughput overhead to 0.65% for an increased detection delay of 120
seconds. This experiment confirms that the user can decide the amount
of overhead that is acceptable for the application, at the cost of detection
delay. At the same time, the design of the system does not allow an at-
tacker to avoid detection by exploiting the detection delay introduced for
performance reasons.
NUMA Effects
Modern multi-processor systems employ non-uniform memory access
(NUMA). We investigated the performance effects of the CPU socket place-
ment of the monitor thread. In the baseline setup, we use a single monitor
thread running on socket 0 to monitor memory on both NUMA sockets.
We wish to evaluate the performance of a monitor thread only inspecting
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local memory on the socket that it is running. In Table 6.2 we compare this
against the default setup inspecting both NUMA nodes, but also against an
artificially suboptimal setup where a monitor thread inspects memory on
the remote socket only. The number of canaries on each socket is different,
because the second socket is running more worker threads that maintain
more state compared to RX threads. We normalize this by reporting the
number of canaries inspected per unit of time, and observe that the dif-
ference, while matching our expectations in quality, is not significant. The
reason must be that remote memory accesses suffer significantly in terms of
latency, but not throughput. That is of course as long as the interconnect be-
tween the CPUs is not overloaded. This is not the case in our experiments,
but we can observe the effects of NUMA placements on the interconnect by
showing the local vs. the remote memory traffic. We can see that with the
optimal NUMA placement there is no remote memory traffic for the core
running the monitor thread. This would motivate using multiple monitor
threads, one on each NUMA node, inspecting only local memory.
6.6 Discussions
6.6.1 Tunable Overhead
MemPatrol offers developers and operators control over its runtime over-
head. A similar idea was pursued by ASAP [132], which automatically
instruments the program to maximize its security while staying within a
specified overhead budget. Unlike MemPatrol, ASAP controls the over-
head by decreasing coverage, while MemPatrol achieves this by increasing
detection delay without compromising eventual detection. Cruiser [148]
also discussed a possible approach to increase its efficiency using back-off
strategies to pace the monitor thread with nop instructions or sleep calls.
However, without proper isolation of the monitor thread, this approach
undermines Cruiser’s security guarantees.
Some KIMs tackle transient attacks by snooping the bus traffic using PCI
cards [83] or even commodity GPGPUs [64]. MemPatrol is quite similar
to KIMs using periodic memory inspection, but monitors applications, so
does not require a hypervisor or dedicated hardware.
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6.6.2 Memory Safety
The case-study of MemPatrol for heap memory integrity is based on heap-
canary countermeasures, and specifically those that use a monitor running
in parallel with the protected application [125, 148]. Note, however, the
proprietary network traffic identification system (NCORE) we evaluated,
also uses stack-based overflow protections on top of MemPatrol, and the
mere use of memory pools also offers some level of protection against
temporal-safety violations through the reuse of memory only for objects
with identical layout, which can prevent most abuses of function pointer
fields [4].
Finally, it is worth comparing MemPatrol with inline solutions offering
similar security guarantees. For example, inline heap canary checking
[108] can be very efficient, but suffers from unbounded detection delay,
as detection relies on checks triggered by events such as deallocations. In
the case of NCORE [96], a passive network traffic identification system on
which MemPatrol was evaluated, heap allocations for certain objects such as
host state may linger for several days. MemPatrol, on the other hand, puts
a bound on the detection delay. Other inline solutions detect buffer over-
flows immediately by instrumenting every memory write to check whether
it overwrites a canary. WIT [5], for example, uses this approach, which con-
tributes the bulk of its runtime overhead of 4–25% for CPU bound bench-
marks, which is prohibitive for some performance-critical applications.
6.7 Conclusion
In summary, this work applied an integrity monitoring solution, MemPa-
trol, to a high-performance network monitoring system, demonstrating 0%
CPU-time overhead for the application’s threads. The hidden memory
bandwidth overheads also concerned us, but MemPatrol demonstrated how
to minimize them to under 1%. We conclude with some remarks on current
limitations and future directions.
Importantly, this case study’s memory safety guarantees are limited to
heap buffer overflow detection, and can be thwarted by memory disclosure
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attacks. Future work is required to identify additional memory integrity
applications.
Moreover, the current MemPatrol prototype cannot register additional
memory locations to monitor after initialization, but this limitation is not
fundamental. We could intermix monitoring with processing of registra-
tion requests received through a message queue. As long as bookkeeping
data structures are append-only, the threat of replay attacks is averted. A
general solution for supporting arbitrary updates, however, is an interest-
ing future direction.
Creating the binary code for a system like MemPatrol is currently a te-
dious, manual process. As pointed out in Loop-Amnesia [117], some level
of compiler support, e.g. to control register spilling, would help.
Finally, the full security of AES may be overkill given the bound on de-
tection latency, and lowering the number of AES rounds used could be
considered as a way to increase the monitor thread’s performance.
7
Conclusions
This research presented MIU, Memory Integrity Utilities, including both
an inline and sideline monitoring system for memory safety. MIU focuses
on the cost of memory safety and the solutions for possible practical de-
ployment of the enforcement.
MemPatrol adopted concurrency for the minimal performance to the level
of production deployment. Running a concurrent monitor realised 0%
CPU-time overhead for applications’ threads and configurable overheads
that is useful for systems whose workloads changes over the time. The
support of synchronous communication may bring more run-time over-
heads for synchronisation between a monitor thread and user threads, so
MemPatrol chose asynchronous communication like many other concur-
rent models. The challenge of an asynchronous concurrent monitor is the
time gap between memory corruption and its detection. This work pro-
posed and implemented a monitor isolation technique using registers as
the monitor’s private memory.
FRAMER and spaceMiu are compiler-assisted, inline monitoring systems
based on a tagged pointer-capability model with object granularity. These
systems exploit the currently unused significant 16 bits of pointers to store
a tag. The complete and generic encoding derives a metadata pointer from
a pointer to any kind of objects and this removes the consumption of mem-
ory for padding or alignment, that benefits all levels of memory hierarchy.
It also demonstrates excellent D-cache performance. This approach tol-
erates the increase in dynamic instruction used for arithmetic operations
for the efficiency in both memory footprint and D-cache hits. This pro-
vides great advantages for hardware implementation, since the overheads
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for arithmetic operations will be largely resolved with ISA, whereas it is
difficult for memory footprint and D-cache hits.
This capability model is evaluated on memory/type safety – array out-
of-bounds and type confusion checking. One of the main focuses is to
cover all kinds of spatial memory corruptions, while keeping the efficiency
in memory. Firstly, this work showed how frame encoding can be used for
bounds checking guaranteeing near-zero negatives caused by violation of
intended referents that challenged previous memory safety solutions with
per-object metadata storage. Secondly, this capability model proposed a
framework for near-complete memory safety detecting internal overflows
and unsafe type casts with the support of additional descriptors.
For the future design, some parts of the designs can be improved. This
work sacrifices dynamic instruction counts for memory efficiency and com-
plete memory safety, since the overhead from arithmetic operations are the
easiest to resolve with hardware acceleration. However, this overhead still
needs to be reduced for software-based solutions. This work proved the
small increase in memory overheads, so we expect to reduce the run-time
overhead with more memory overhead by re-arranging objects. Derivation
of the header address of large-framed objects requires additional arithmetic
operations and more importantly the objects causes cache misses through
indirect access through the supplementary table. Minimising or even re-
moving, if possible, the large-framed objects can also resolve the overheads
for branches.
This capability design could benefit other programming language secu-
rity mechanisms as well above C/C++, and has a wide range of applica-






Given an object o and its wrapper frame f , let’s assume there exists a
smaller frame x that has o inside. Since o resides in both f and x, we can
conclude that x is a subframe of f . According to the assumption, the base
address of o (baseo) is within the range of x, hence, we get basex ≤ baseo.
Here, f is o’s wrapper frame, so baseo is placed in f ’s lower subframe. x
is a subframe of f , hence x must be f ’s lower subframe. This is resolved
to contradiction between the assumption (x has o inside) and the definition
of wrapper function (o’s upper bound in the upper subframe). Hence, we
can conclude that there is no smaller frame than o’s wrapper frame; this is
actually the unique wrapper frame, and it can be used as a reference point.
8.1.2 Proof 2
We prove that for each N, there exists at most one N-object mapped to each
entry of a division array, and show N identifies an object mapped to the
same division array. To prove this, we assume there exist two distinctive
objects, x and y; both are N-objects (N ≥ 16) mapped to the same division
array. Since x and y are N-objects, their wrapper frame ( fx and fy) is
2N-sized by definition. The division is the only one that fx and fy are
mapped to as shown previously, so fx and fy have the same base address
as the division. In addition, both frames have the same size, so they are
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identical. Both base addresses of x and y (bx, by) must be in the lower
(N − 1)-subframe of fx (or fy), and end addresses must be in the other
sub-frame. From this, bx and by must be smaller than ex and ey. However,
the objects are distinct, so bx < ex < by < ey or vice versa must hold. The
assumption leads to a contraction. We conclude that for each N, there is a
unique N-object mapped to one division array.
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